to Mankind in general”. The same holds for the “Ties of Blood”, which let us prefer the interests of our close relatives. He realizes that such a denial of private desire may be strenuous, and he offers two ways out: On the one hand, he says that we have to cultivate public affections – which shows that not all customs and habits are bad and not all natural dispositions are good. On the other, he claims that those who are most benevolent to their relatives are, as an empirical fact, also most beneficial for the public at large, so that there is no real conflict. Hutcheson’s consideration for “oeconomy” and his presentation of moral relations by mathematical formulas foreshadows Bentham’s utilitarianism, and Hutcheson’s theory of punishment anticipates Bentham’s reforms: “Who can dwell upon a Scene of Tortures, tho practis’d upon the vilest Wretch; or can delight either in the Sight or Description of Vengeance, prolonged beyond all necessity of Self-Defense, or publick Interest? […] Human Punishments are only Methods of Self-Defense; in which the Degrees of Guilt are not the proper Measure, but the Necessity of restraining Actions for the Safety of the Publick”.

Against rationalist philosophers, Hutcheson stresses that reason can only find out means for elected ends, and that in the choosing of ends we need “some implanted Instinct for which we can give no reason; otherwise there could be no Action of any kind”. His anti-rationalism is not only a causal, but also an ethical claim. He explicitly distinguishes between “exciting reasons” and “justifying reasons”, but both cannot work antecedent to any sense or affection. The question remains what it really means when we say that some conduct is judged to be reasonable. Hutcheson reconstructs this conviction as the result of a conflict between the violent passions and the calm desires. We should develop a “calm universal benevolence”, and a natural inclination of this kind is especially laudable. While a Kantian might especially praise a person who overcomes bad inclinations by a sense of duty, Hutcheson doubts the appropriateness of terms like “Duty, Obligation, Owing” for the foundation of ethics: ought is a “confused” and “unlucky” word in morals.

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Given the success and achievement of the Glasgow edition of the works of Adam Smith, one is forced to wonder why the marketplace needs another edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Raphael and Macfie’s version of TMS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976/Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1982) provided both a definitive edition and a spark that ignited a new wave of Smith research. Their
paperback is inexpensive, informative, meticulously cross-referenced, and presents Smith’s sixth edition well-rooted in his five earlier versions. A scholar does not need more.

Nevertheless, if anyone has earned the right to try to repackage Smith, it is Knud Haakonssen. His *Science of the Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) is definitive in its own right, providing a convincing account of what Smith’s lost theory of jurisprudence might look like, and his *Natural Law and Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) places Smith squarely in a specific and important discourse that refines Smith’s contribution to the philosophy of law. Two collections of essays have proven Haakonssen’s editorial prowess: *Traditions of Liberalism* (New South Wales: Centre for Independent Studies, 1988) anticipated much of what would follow in Smith scholarship. *Adam Smith* (*International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy*) (Hampshire: Ashgate, 1998) collects almost thirty years of important work on Smith in one volume, although at an asking price of over 160 U.S. dollars, it may be too expensive to be useful to anyone. Haakonssen also penned the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry on Smith, a worthy introduction far more representative of contemporary Smith studies than its predecessor in MacMillan’s *1967 Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*.

Haakonssen’s edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* is part of the series *Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy*. It has a forthcoming companion volume also edited by Haakonssen, *The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith*. Whereas the Glasgow edition is grand in scope, Haakonssen’s *TMS* is modest. The earlier edition sought to attract scholars, but Haakonssen’s volume is designed to be accessible to those with minimal interest in or experience of Smith. It has comparatively few footnotes and no technical discussions. It does include references to major changes in Smith’s editions but it does not overburden the reader with the smaller variations.

The Haakonssen edition is physically easier to read. The font is more airy and the spacing between lines is further apart. The edition also skips lines between the paragraphs, making the text seem much less compact than in the Glasgow edition. In short, there is simply more white space on Haakonssen’s page, and for undergraduates who are easily overwhelmed, this may prove to be a true blessing. With that said, Haakonssen’s *TMS* seems less formidable. Perhaps I have just grown accustomed to my worn Liberty Press paperback, but the earlier edition feels more like *philosophy*. I enjoy its weight in my hand, and the paper texture brings with it a reverence that the Cambridge edition does not. It seems as if Raphael and Macfie have offered us a real book while Haakonssen has supplied us with a textbook.

In addition, citing Haakonssen’s text will prove more problematic than Smith scholars are used to. While Haakonssen has chosen to continue the practice of
numbering Smith’s paragraphs, he has not included the paragraph numbers in the page header, an omission that makes the book much harder to navigate than its predecessors. And the two-footnote style, with letters for Smith’s footnotes and numbers for Haakonssen’s, proves more confusing than one might think. As for the substance of the footnotes themselves, few in Haakonssen’s TMS contain much that is new from the Glasgow edition.

From time to time, Haakonssen does elaborate on the earlier text. For example, at VI.ii.5, Smith refers to “Marcus Antoninius” which requires explanation. Raphael and Macfie include a footnote stating simply “Marcus Aurelius”, whereas Haakonssen explains more fully, “Marcus Aurelius (121-80 AD) became Roman Emperor, adding Antoninus to his name, in 161. His Stoic Meditations were written during the last ten years of his life and published posthumously” (p. 278).

At other times, however, Haakonssen shortens the notes when, perhaps, it would have been better not to. For example, at I.iii.2.10 Smith refers to a prince who disgraced an army officer by caning him publicly. The Glasgow edition footnote is elaborate, providing more useful context. It begins with the assertion that “we cannot identify the incident” then continues with an explanation of how even Frederick William 1 of Prussia, “who was fond of using the cane, drew the line at officers, let alone generals”. The entire note runs just short of one hundred words. In contrast, Haakonssen’s note states only that, “the episode has not been identified” (p.71). I am not sure how useful such a footnote can be.

Despite its drawbacks, the volume makes an important contribution to Smith scholarship with its introductory essay. There is a dearth of full-length contemporary introductory discussions of Smith. Only three are currently on the market: E.G. West’s Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1976), which contains too much biography and not enough philosophy; D.D. Raphael’s Adam Smith (Past Masters) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) which is excellent although a bit dated, and is now only published in a larger volume packaged with two other books; and my own On Adam Smith (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2002). Thus Haakonssen’s essay is welcome. (In the section listing additional reading, Haakonssen identifies Jerry Z. Muller’s Adam Smith in His Time and Ours as a general introduction. While I find Muller’s books to be indispensable, it is far from introductory. Few beginners would be willing to wade through Muller’s obscure history.)

At only seventeen pages, the essay is outstanding and essential for all Smith’s readers. Haakonssen essay engages several important discussions. He prepares the reader for Smith’s moral psychology; he presents justice and imagination as central concepts in TMS; and he challenges the notion that the impartial spectator is an ideal observer theory. Perhaps most important, Haakonssen adroitly places Smith squarely in contemporary debate regarding pluralism. Of TMS’s treatment of justice, he writes, “The feature of justice which makes it so important in human life is its ability to regulate behaviour between entire strangers who do not know anything else about each other [other] than that they are capable, as we all are, of
injury and of being injured. However, what counts as injury is not a universal matter; it varies dramatically from one type of society to another” (p. ix).

Haakonssen’s emphasis on Smith’s culturally sensitive approach makes TMS all the more relevant for contemporary readers. He shows Smith’s anticipation of those who claim that identity is, in some sense, constructed by community, writing that for Smith, “we only become aware of ourselves – gain self-consciousness – through our relationship to others” (xiv). It may have been beneficial for Haakonssen to provide specifics in the essay, citing, for example, III.i.3 where Smith asserts that agents in isolation are incapable of moral and aesthetic judgment, but armed with Haakonssen’s preparatory remarks, the reader will hopefully recognize the point when he or she encounters it.

Haakonssen’s TMS will be useful for the pedagogue who wishes to present a more accessible Smith to an introductory audience. However, and ironically, while the primary text will be less interesting to the scholar, it is the introductory essay geared towards the layperson that will prove as necessary for the specialist as it is for the uninitiated.

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James Otteson seeks to reconstruct, or assemble (p.102), from Smith’s texts – principally The Theory of Moral Sentiments but also The Wealth of Nations and other writings (especially Considerations on language) – a common or single project, at the core of which is the ‘market model’. According to Otteson, “Smith saw” this model as the “key to understanding the creation, development and maintenance of human social life” (p. 287). It is in terms of this model that Smith shows in TMS how a system of moral standards develops as an unintended result of the numberless free exchanges people make with each other (p. 172). The similarity of this with the economic analysis in WN is, of course, not coincidental. The discussion of the Considerations interestingly and illuminatingly shows how the model can travel. Of this last discussion Otteson says the model is present only in a rudimentary fashion or as a “germ”(p. 274). The reason why Otteson puts it that way is revealing. He says that Smith drew upon it “to construct a model that could explain more and more of human behaviour” (p. 260). Two pages before this we have been told that there is an “absence of explicit textual evidence of such an intention”, that is, that the market model was the key to understanding social life. What this then amounts is that Smith has (saw) a model but though its articulation is his intention that is not explicit in the text(s) so Otteson has to explicate or reconstruct it.