UND Banner UND Banner UND Banner
  NUREMBERG TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS | Nazi Occupation of Norway  

25 May–A–MW–17–2–Gallagher (Int.Evand)

THE PRESIDENT: You may have the same privileges and rights with respect to the documents that have been heretofore indicated.

DR. FRITSCH: I merely have one request, Your Honor. In my opening statement I made a motion to strike Counts I and IV of the Indictment. I would now like to ask the Tribunal to rule on this motion.

THE PRESIDENT: If you desire a ruling on that motion at this time, inasmuch as the testimony is now in,the [sic] motion will be overruled, because that is one of the essential questions that will have to be determined when the opinion is written. If there is no proof of these, why, of course, then those Counts have not been substantiated, but at this time the motion will be overruled.

DR. MECKEL: Dr. Meckel for the defendant, Admiral Schniewind.

May it please the Tribunal:

The IMT trial against the so-called chief war criminals which opened the various Nuernberg [sic] trials was meant to establish who were the primarily guilty persons responsible for the great international disaster of World War II, and the crimes committed in connection therewith. In that trial, two admirals of the German Navy were also sentenced, the Grand Admirals Raeder and Doenitz.

I consider the verdict particularly worthy of notice, as the IMT did not convict the two admirals on the most incriminating counts, i.e. submarine warfare.

Based on the evidence submitted by the defense, the IMT found that, although some of the measures ordered in naval warfare did constitute [first t typed over an i] violations of ratified pacts, they could however, not be interpreted as violations of international law which would be punishable, as in practice all nations waging naval war, including England and the United States, acted exactly as the Germans did. The direction of German naval operations, i.e. the actual task and sphere of responsibility of the German admirals has thus been vindicated by the verdict of the highest tribunal of the victor nations. In spite of this however, the two chiefs


25 May–A–MW–17–3–Gallagher (Int.Evand)

of naval operations were sentenced, namely for their participation in as well as preparation and direction of the planning for aggressive war, with every nation which claimed to have a disciplined Government the decision of peace or war is one of a political nature, a decision made by the head of the state and the government and not by the soldiers.

This viewpoint was also held at that time by officers of other countries, who opposed an opinion according to which military leaders were considered cooresponsible [sic] and convicted for acts which were outside their scope of duties, and which they had not authority to decide upon.

On the other hand, the view was held that a commander-in-chief who represents his brand of the Wehrmacht with the political leadership also had a certain political responsibility, because he, in his capacity as representative of the armed forces under his command, should have been able to exert some measure of influence upon the political leadership and should have made a point of doing so.

The justification of this particular opinion is a moot point, especially when one considers the conditions prevailing in Germany at that time, but this argumentation does not hold water if it is used for calling other military leaders to account, who, without ever having been close to exercise any political influence, were solely concerned with their military duties.

If now, after two years, the prosecution in the last of the Nuernberg [sic] trials once again demands that an admiral be convicted because he was allegedly corresponsible [sic] for aggressive war, it by far transgresses the boundaries of a thesis, which at least theoretically justifies the charge of corresponsibility [sic], and enters the realm of the boundless. If, in doing so, the prosecution refers to the verdict against the two Grand Admirals in order to substantiate its demands it overlooks completely – either deliberately or unintentionally – that the prerequisites were entirely different.

The prosecution attempted to stress quite especially the importance


25 May–A–MW–17–4–Gallagher (Int.Evand)

of Admiral Schniewind's official positions and the part which he allegedly played after World War I in the German Navy. I do not know whether certain exaggerations are the result of erroneous conclusions, or whether they were seriously meant to substantiate the indictment. I am particularly in the dark as to from what time on the prosecution claims the defendant to be guilty of criminal acts by his participation in preparing aggressive war. According to addendum A [?] of the indictment, it has been alleged that the defendants committed crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as early as 1919. In 1919, the former Lieutenant commander Schniewind was a prisoner of war in the hands of the British, and in 1920 he as the skipper of a mine sweeper.

Furthermore, in its opening statement, the prosecution claims that in the years after the seizure of power by the Nazis, the admiral was one of the Navy's officers with the highest seniority of service and rank. In actual fact, however, in 1933 he was commander and commanding officer of a cruiser, i.e. a naval unit which at best is comparable to a regiment, [sic] Even in 1938, he was nothing but one of the youngest rear-admirals of the Navy.

The defense does not intend to do the same and, on its part, attempt to diminish the position and importance of the admiral. However, I deem it right and necessary at first to demonstrate the admiral's actual position. For, I think it is unfair to exaggerate the importance and tasks of a person and to ascribe to him knowledge and information derived from such fictitious importance, which he could not have possibly had, and furthermore to expect him of having passed decisions which he could not have possible passed, as well as having acted in a manner which was altogether an impossibility. 


25 May–A–JP–18–1–Goldberg (Int. Evand)
Court V  Case XII

The prosecution considers the rearmement [sic] program of the German Wehrmacht as the first step towards the preparation for aggressive war, and, accordingly, considers any participation in this rearmement [sic] drive criminal and thus punishable.

Or in other words, the prosecution wants to construe the fact that a person had cognizance of armament measures in violation of treaties, as being tantamount to having [v and i typed over i and indiscernible letter] knowledge of intentions to wage aggressive war. Much has been said in this trial to refute this assertion.

The documents concerning the rearmement [sic] program as it affected the Navy, which have been submitted by the prosecution have no connection whatsoever with the admiral, not [sic] do they prove his participation or, altogether that he had knowledge of armament measures which violated international agreements. 

On the whole, the indictment has been drafted in such general terms that it was really difficult to find any clearly defined charges against the admiral. A considerable part of the evidence submitted consists of military orders which the admiral received, forwarded, or drafted. When this evidence was submitted, hardly any other comment was made, except "Initialed by Schniewind" or "signed by Schniewind". I cannot conceivable [sic] see how the admiral's activity of receiving drafting, or passing on of orders can be called an incriminating face [sic], for even the prosecution states that this is part of the duties of officers in all the armies in the world.

However, the prosecution seems to be under the impression that, by submitting these orders, it has proved the admirals knowledge, derived from these orders, or the illegal nature of these planned wars, which were then waged at a later date.

A military order or an operational plan are not a diplomatic note, and if, occasionally, somewhat aggressive words were used in such orders and directives it has to be considered that these order [sic] were drafted for the case that war did break out, and that the recipient of such orders,


25 May–A–JP–18–2–Goldberg (Int. Evand)
Court V  Case XII

who was to prepare himself mentally as well as actuating material preparations for just a case was also expected to imagine any given situation which would exist if war broke out. Everything leading up to this point is outside the military sphere, and in the majority of cases it can be assumed that all such matters are far removed from any influence a soldier could possibly expect. The concept of aggressive war itself, which has become the basis in all these trials, is unknown to the soldierely [sic] mind per se, at least in so far as it refers to the legalistic concept. Whether a war is waged assdefensive [sic] or offensive war depends on totally different conditions than the fact that a war can be characterized as an aggressive or defensive war. Even a defensive war may be conducted by practicing offensive tactics. It is a fact though, that the legal minds of all counties have argued for many decades how the concept aggressive war could be defined. All proposals that have been advanced to elucidate this concept and tofix [sic] it once for all were never unanimously approved. If, for example, we would accept the definition that was put forth during the 1933 disarmament conference, we could even arrive at the conclusion that the war which started on 1 September 1939 was an aggressive war launched by Poland [smudge] for even on 23 and 24 August, German airplanes which flew outside Polish territory were shot at by Polish batteries. In view of such an involved situation, is it fair to expect a soldier to show so much distrust toward his own government that he examines an ordered preparation for mobilization, or has it examined, whether or not it might lead to an aggressive war, from a legalistic point of view?

Nevertheless, the prosecution does claim that they can prove beyond any doubt the knowledge of the unlawful character of the wars with which we are concerned. In order to convince the court of its contention, the prosecution has sketched an overall picture of the events of the past 20 years. I claim that this picture is wrong from an objective point of view. In order to illustrate those events, the prosecution has submitted document [sic] partly taken from their context, newspaper reports and other material if


25 May–A–JP–18–3–Goldberg (Int. Evand)
Court V  Case XII

they served its purpose; however, it did not mention other important documents which would have been absolutely necessary in order to present an actual and true picture. The whole picture. The whole picture deviates from historic facts.

However, by selecting documents, two totally different versions can be presented is clearly shown by the documents and publications [c typed over s] which some months [t typed over g] ago were published both by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. All of the published documents come from the same collection of documentary material, i.e. from captured German archives, from which, incidentally, also the evidence of the prosecution has been taken.

With those publications, the United States intend to prove that the Soviet Union's assistance and active support made it possible for Germany to wage aggressive war.

The Soviet Union's publications, on the other hand, are meant to show and to prove that the Western Powers' "Policy of Appeasement" encouraged Hitler in his aggressive course, and made it possible for him to launch his aggressive acts.

I am of the opinion that those two assertions are at least just as diametrically opposed to one another, as in our case the claims and counterclaim [type fades away] of the prosecution and the defense. Both in this as in the afore-mentioned case, a true picture can only be gained if a critical person knows not only the material selected by one party, but is also familiar with the whole material.

Furthermore, in its presentation the prosecution has the advantage of the fact that the picture of events drawn by it has been disseminated for years in a similar form and with all means of modern propaganda technique, and has been thoroughly drummed into the minds of world public opinion.

Comparing the essays and books which, in the years after World War I, deal with the war guilt, both those that appeared in 1920 and 1921 as well as in the ‘thirties,' it can be seen that opinions concerning the 


25 May–A–JP–18–4–Goldberg (Int. Evand)
Court V  Case XII

guilt question changed quote materially in the Versailles Treaty, Germany was called the country solely responsible for World War I.

In 1929 Emil L u d w i g [sic], who certainly is above suspicion to be favorable inclibed [sic] towards the Kaiser's Germany, wrote, in the preface to his book "July 1914", the following in exactly the same words as quoted here: "All of Europe must share the guilt for the war. That has been definitely established by the "research work" in all the countries. Germany's sole guilt and Germany's innocence are fairy-tales both on this and the opposite banks of the Rhine. Which country wanted the war? Let us couch our questions in different terms: What circles in all the countries wanted the war, facilitated its coming about, or started it?

If instead of applying a horizontal yardstick right across Europe, a vertical measuring rod probes all classes of society, the following facts emerge: The whole blame can be put squarely on all the cabiners [sic], yet, conversely, Europe's masses were completely and totally innocent."

Once more, the German people were defeated in a World War, and again allegation [sic] were made already during the war that Germany was solely responsible for the war.

I will add something here: The attempt must not be made to justify these things but I think that it is extremely difficult, in a period immediately after a war, to assess and evaluate correctly and thoroughly, in the light of history, all the events and developments, when, in its wake, wrath, vindictiveness, acrimony and politically twisted tendencies pervade the minds of people. I am certain of the impossibility to act in such a way when all, even highly confidential, secret documents, are available to one party, while the archives remain closed for the other side.

However, I do not want to attempt the impossible here, i.e. to substitute the prosecution's version by the correct one, especially as this goes beyond the scope of my work. Whatever might have been the actual and true course of events and their backgrounds, I am sure that the defendants had a different conception at that time, because their


25 May–A–JP–18–5–Goldberg (Int. Evand)
Court V  Case XII

knowledge and ideas were formed on the basis of entirely different documents and sources. Also, many facts which are new [e typed over o] universally known were not known to the defendants at that time. Therefore, the picture sketched by the prosecution is subjectively false, to say the least.

Consequently. [sic] I am forced to correct this picture, at any rate in so far as it concerns the impression Admiral S c h n i e w i n d [sic] was bound to have had of events and developments at that time. The prosecution version creates the impression that the tension between Poland and Germany did not commence [c typed over d] until the years immediately preceding 1939 and was, in the most essential points, ignited by Germany propaganda moves and conceived in order to establish the necessary outward precedent to justify the acquisition of foreign territory by forces of arms, which was the dream of the National Socialist leaders and enhanced by the warlike appetites of the militaristically minded officers. The prosecution takes pains to avoid, however, even hinting at the actual situation in those controversial border regions in the years after World War I, and to make any mention at all regarding its development in the subsequent decade, although it certainly does not economize in using background material from that period.

However, matters are by no means as clear and sefl-evident [sic] as the prosecution would like to make them. I would like to try elaborating on this as briefly as possible.

I can assume that the German-Polish borders as fixed in the Versailles Treaty are known. The so-called "Polish Corridor" was created, and the population living therein was just as little consulted as the people in the Province of Posen. Unfortunately, the principle of the right of self-determination of the nations, which had just been announced, did not apply to Germany. East Prussia was severed from the Reich and became an island surrounded by Polish and Lithuanian territory. Even at an earlier date, the well known Polish nationalist D m o w s k i [sic] commented on this in a memorandum to W i l s o n [sic] of 8 October 1918.


25 May–A–JP–18–6–Goldberg
Court V  Case XII

"If East Prussia is to remain connected with the other German territories, Polish West Prussia too should remain in the hands if [sic] Germany. If East Prussia, as a separate German [slash through G] possession and disconnected from the bulk of the country by interposing Polish territory, does remain in the hands of Germany it is bound to become a constant trouble spot between Poland and Germany, which latter country will continuously endeavor to reinstate a connection at the expense of Poland. If Poland is to become a really free nation, independent of the Germans, there are only two solutions to the East Prussian problem: either the Province of Koenigsberg, that is, that part of East Prussia where the population speaks the German language, should [s typed over w] be merged with the Polish state on the basis of an autonomous status, or it will have to become a small and independent republic, linked with Poland by a customs union."

The Polish nationalist leader himself admits here that for any length of time the corridor would mean a thorn in the flesh of Germany, a situation which did not present an alternative. Thus, right from the outset the German-Polish relations were already overshadowed by an untenable situation.

Only there where Polish desires for allocation of territory at the expense of Germany would exceed all ressonable [sic] standards, it was agreed that a plebiscite be taken. It is true, the purely German city of Danzig, which the negotiators where reluctant to conceed [sic] to Poland, was torn away from the Reich and itransformed [sic] into an independent "free city" without a plebiscite. Thus, on 11 June 1920 a plebiscite took place in these parts of East Prussia which, under the supervision of the allies, was conducted and which resulted in a majority vote of from 93 to 97 percent for Germany. In spite of this incontestable result, three villages in the Osterode District as well as five villagesiin [sic] the Marienwerder District were incorporated into Poland.

The treatment of Upper Silesia constitutes a particularly sad chapter. After protracted negotiations, in which Polish requests were constantly backed up by France, a plebiscite was fixed for Upper Silesia, which province the Poles had claimed in its entirety. On 20 March 1921, the Upper Silesian people irrevocably decided in favor of remaining Germans. Out of 1, 186, 758 [sic] votes, 709,393 were cast for Germany, and only 479,365 for Poland. This overwhelming confession of loyalty to Germany, however, did not deter the Poles from pursuing their original aims. At the


25 May–A–JP–18–7–Goldberg
Court V  Case XII

beginning of May 1920, the Polish plebiscite commissar Woiczech Korfanty, who had been appointed by order of the allied powers for the mandatory plebicite [sic] in Upper Silesia, and who was assured of the backing of the French General Le Rond, unleased [sic] the so-called first Polish insurgents, which resulted in a tremendous wave of persecutions against everything German right under the very eyes of the French. Italian occupation troops, who refused to connive at those machinations [sic] suffered more than 300 fatalities during the fight against the insurgents.

THE PRESIDENT: At this time we will take our afternoon recess.

THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess until 1515.

(A recess was taken.)


25 May–A–MJ–20–1–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court 5,  Case 12

THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.

DR. SURHOLT: Dr. Surholt, representing General Reinecke. 

Your Honor, I would ask the Tribunal to excuse my client for tomorrow and the day after tomorrow from attending these sessions in order to prepare his defense.

THE PRESIDENT: He may be excused. The record will so show.

DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Rauschenbach representing defendant Woehler.

Your Honor, I would also ask the Tribunal to excuse the defendant Woehler from attending court sessions on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday in order to prepare his defense.

THE PRESIDENT: He may be excused. The record will show.


This outrageous procedure, induced Lloyd George on 13 May 1921 to make the following statements in the British House of Commons:

"The Allied Commission unanimously decided that the parts which had cast an overwhelming vote for Poland, were to be ceded to the Poles. Right, now, however, the Poles have staged an insurgence and put the allies before a fait accompli, [sic] This step was a complete break with the Versailles Peace Treaty. If we do not deal with the situation squarely and fairly, this will result in ominous consequences for the peace in Europe. If Poland should be permitted to overrun this province, it really would mean trouble. In that event, Germany would have a right to say to the allies: ‘You have forced us to abide by our promise but what indeed did you do to make good your promises?' For us it is not only a question of honor but also of security when we show that we abide by treaty obligations, quite conceivably happen [sic] that somebody said, so what, they are only Germans! But these people, too, have a right to claim everything that has been conceded to them based on treaty agreements. That the Poles


25 May–A–MJ–20–2–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court 5,  Case 12

should be permitted to take away Upper Silesia in complete disregard of the peace treaty, and that the Germans should not have the right to defend aprovince [sic] which has been theirs for the past 200 years, and which for 600 years certainly was anything else but Polish, would be an ignominous [sic] notion and unworthy of every country's honor."

On 12 May 1921 the German self-defense formations, fighting under ineffable odds, succeeded in recapturing the Anna Mountain in Upper Silesia, as well as in regaining other territories. When further German successes were imminent, the French occupation troops demanded a truce which was approved. During the session of the Supreme Allied Council, Lloyd George put forth the demand that the industrial area was not to be divided. However, when an agreement could not be reached there, a league of nation commission was empowered to reach a decision; this commission, consisted of one Chinese, Belgian, Czech, Brazilain [sic], and Spanish representative each.

The commission then decided that two-fifths of the industrial areas was to be ceded to Poland. Contrary to the incontestable result of the plebiscite, Germany lost her, in the age of the right of self-determination for all nations, 321,342 hectars [sic] with 22 zinc foundries and 11 zinc and lead pits. Of 37 blast furnaces, Germany lost 23; of 67 coal mines, 53; of 14 iron milling plants, 9; and of 25 steel and iron foundries, 15. So innately inept, so absolutely contrary to all conceptions of sound economic thinking is this border demarcation in favor of Poland, that even the planners who conceived the creation of this European boundary, which is the most inadequate one next to the Polish corridor, themselves voiced the opinion that the torn and cut up Province of Upper Silesia wouldnot [sic] be able to exist in this shape. Therefore, they demanded a special agreement. On 15 May 1922 an agreement was signed in Geneva which


25 May–A–MJ–20–3–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court 5,  Case 12

with the 606 articles and innumerable addenda and implementation regulations is one of the most voluminous legal texts of the entire post war period, and which in itself probably is the best proof that by the cutting up of Upper Silesia the conditions thus created were completely untenable.

Your Hohers [sic], such were the labors which accompanied the birth of the Polish nation. You will understand, I'm sure, that these facts were bound to cloud permanently German-Polish relations. Polant's [sic] fight against the predominantly German population in Upper Silesia continued. It would lead too far even to produce a selection from numerous instances of this fight, which lasted more than a decade.

Howeven [sic], as the only example I am going to mention, I would like to select the 1930 elections for the Polish Parliament and Senate. In order to prevent the German population from demonstrating their true opinion, the Warsaw Ministry of the Interior issued a decree according to which each voter was at liberty to hand his ballot slip either openly or secretly. The decree furthermore stated that those who adhered to a secret ballot were to be considered an enemy of the state. Encouraged by this decree, the chairman of the District Election Committee for the election presinct [c typed over s] III in Kattowicz, issued the following written announcement:

"a) On election day, the charrman [i typed over first r] of election committees and their associates will appear in the uniform of the insurgents. 

"b) Eight to ten insurgents will be present in each election room and keep the voters under constant observation, watching which kind of ballot slip they have in their hands and which slip they are putting into the envelope.

"c) Of course, in the election room itself no voter must be molested. However, for incidents that might occur out-


25 May–A–MJ–20–4–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court 5,  Case 12

side the election room, the election commissar will not be responsible. 

d) All voters whose slips cannot be checked by the insurgents, will be considered an opponent of the Government Party, and will be treated accordingly outside the elections room."

A grosser and more pronounced misuse by official authority for falsifying election results has hardly ever occurred.

Any person who is familiar with the Polish insurgents association can imagine what results these untarnished threats must have had. In this election, the Germans lost more than 100,000 votes. It is true that at a session of the League of Nations on 21 January 1931 the German complaints concerning the November 1930 elections were dealt with. For 45 minutes the Japanese Council Delegate Yosichova severely lashed out against and condemned the conduct of the Poles. However, no further action resulted from this. Liquidation measures of the German rail estate in Poland accompanied those terror measures. Hundred of thousands of Germans were forced to emigrate. 

As early as 27 May 1927, the liquidation commission reported with satisfaction that it had liquidated 4,000 rural and 2,000 city estates properties, and that it had taken away from the Germans 200,000 hectars [sic] of real estate. Such were the conditions when in 1933 Hitler took over the responsibility for German policy.

Hitler's negotiations with the Polish head of State Marshal Pilsudski, which were climaxed by the conclusion of the German – Polish non-agression [sic] pact of the 26 January 1934, seemed to bring about a gradual easing of the tension. However, further developments showed that the genuine and straight forward desire of the Marshal, to come to an understanding, found no reaction in certain circles of the Polish people. Even more pronouncedly after his death in the year 1935 did it seem impossible to improve the mutual relations.

Your Honors: [colon is smudged] I thought it fit to give you this brief account


25 May–A–MJ–20–5–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court 5,  Case 12

in order to show how very strained the relations were at German's Eastern borders since 1919. I shall yet submit further evidence in the course of my case in chief concerning further developments of German – Polish relations in the years prior to Word War II.

Of the operations which, after September 1939, apparently forced one country after the other in war, the prosecution has dealt in detail with the Norwegian Campaign, as far as its evidence against Admiral Schniewind is concerned.

As initial steps to prepare this operation on the part of the Germans were taken by an officer of the navy, the former Admiral Carls, and as the Navy was predominantly engaged in executing this operation, in contrast to the other campaings [sic], I shall yet deal in greater detail with the particular topic in my case in chief, I shall prove which facts were decisive for the planning, the preparation and execution of this operation, and which part of the Admiral Schniewind had in them.

The Western Campaign, the campaign against Yugoslavia and Greece and the war with the Soviet Union, will be dealt with by me less specificially [sic] because of the subordinate part [space] the Navy played in them.


25 May 1948–A–MSD–21–1–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court V,  Case 12

The Prosecution has failed to submit proof for its assertion, that the General Admiral Schniewind, participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Therefore, I submitted a motion once before requesting that the case against the Admiral in connection with Counts II and III be dismissed. The Prosecution holds the following thesis:

a) That this Tribunal, by decree No. 7, is bound to adhere by decisions of the   International Military Tribunal, that the acts of invasions and war under indictment were actually planned in violation of international law, prepared for this purpose and executed,

and secondly,

b) That the defendants, each in his own sphere of duties should have opposed the orders and instructions of their supreme commander and head of state, and that they should have refused to co-operate in the acts now under indictment.

I may assume that it is a practice in all countries and not only in Germany that a soldier is obliged to obey implicitly all instructions and orders given to him, and that this duty is more binding for im [him] than for all other citizens of the state. Any other conduct would fundamentally destroy the striking power of all armed forces, which are employed to defend and protect effectively the interests of their respective countries.

I think it is an absurd presumption if here the judges of an international court, who are meant to pass law impartiall [sic] and without prejudice, are to be pinned down by a decree of the American Zone Commander to pass a decision, even though this decision contradicts their own knowledge and conviction; if, on the other hand, one demands of a soldier subsequently that he should have refused to obey the laws of his country and the instructions given him by his head of state. In this trial, much has been said concerning the evidence submitted by the Prosecution. Also, the difficulties of the defense in procuring and selecting the necessary documents


25 May 1948–A–MSD–21–2–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court V,  Case 12

have been repeatedly dealt with. I do not wish to repeat once more to those statements, but I only want to state quite clearly all those facts which, additionally, are required and essential in the case of the Admiral Schniewind or which are a prerequisite for supplementing my case in chief in this case.

Of 85 documents which the Prosecution has submitted as evidence against Admiral Schniewind, 75 documents have been taken form the records of the OKM and the war diaries of the Naval war operational staff SKL.

As a matter of fact, the OKM records and the war diaries of the SKL are the only documents which are of any real value as evidence, and they are the only documentary evidence which can elucidate events, decisions, and actions within the SKL and the reason which caused them.

Here, the following maxim has been frequently mentioned: "A document speaks for itself." I am of the opinions that this maxim can be used for many abuses and that it does not always apply. All persons conversant with military correspondence of any country– and I believe it is similar in the civil service branches – knows that a letter rarely stands by itself, but that it is somehow inter-related to a preceeding [sic] or subsequent missive. Frequently, preceding documents contain requests, orders, or trains of thoughts which are continued in the following one or which are replied with it, which does not necessarily mean that the initial idea or the reasons are repeated. The author or recipient of such letter is often informed about the contacts even by the existing situation as a whole. If such a letter is torn from its context, and if now it is presented to mean something totally different, highlighting a changed istuation [sic], it will frequently become misleading and equivocal.


25 May 1948–A–MSD–21–3–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court V,  Case 12

All the documents which have been submitted by the Prosecution have been selected from such a collection of records or a bunch of documents, more or less dealing with the same subject matter, and in the majority of cases this was done without simultaneously submitting either documents in the proper context.

The war diary of the SKL not only contains entries  about events of all individual days, reports received and decisions that were passed, but also contains numerous attached folders with documents and essays, and studies which were the basis for all such decisions. The entire situation and the meaning of the individual entries can only be understood if they are presented together with such documents.

Not only am I familiar with the records and war diaries with all their [unclear, enclosures?] from my official activity, but I had access to them also in 1946 when, commissioned by the defense of Admiral Doenitz, I had an opportunity for three weeks to select material for the defense from such documents at the Admiralty in London. I know definitely that these records and war diaries contain highly important documentary material for the defense. Therefore, on the first day of this trial, I applied for permission to sift this material and to select all those documents which were important for the defense.

Yesterday, that is almost four months after my first motion, which I repeated two months ago, I received informatio[n] to the effect the British Administration would not hand over these documents. The fact that I have not any foreign currenc[y] prohibits me or a deputy from going to London to looks at these document on the spot, and I don't know whether attempting to obtain evidence from these documents by other means will succeed or not. I would like to state, therefore, that I


25 May 1948–A–MSD–21–4–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court V,  Case 12

do not have this decisively important material for my defense. If, as a consequence, I should have to submit documents at some points of my case in chief, which might appear less suitable as evidence than others, I shall refer to this whenever the occasion arises and shall substantiate these weak links in my case in chief by testimony of witnesses, who shall prove whether and where more suitable documentary evidence could be obtained.

As the Tribunal ordered that, when parts of a document are submitted, the defense was to be given access to the entire document, I have applied that I received at least the war diaries from which the Prosecution has selected individual pages for submission. In this connection I would like to mention that a war diary for each individual month consists of from 400 to 600 pages. If the Prosecution selects one, two, or even three pages from such a war diary to be submitted before the court, it is quite impossible that a clarification of each individual situation at issue can be obtained from this fraction of material. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the demand of the defense to receive the remaining parts of those particular diaries is quite justified. However, I did not receive those war diaries either, and I merely receive information that the Prosecution actual y [sic] had only those pages it had submitted. Furthermore it was stated that an inquiry in Washington proved that those documents were only available as microfilms, which could not be handed out, and that copies of the entire war diary could not be made because of the considerable amount of the material. Besides, it was siad [sic], that this material was classified as secret information, and that before it could be handed out, the competent authorities would have to have it reclassified.


25 May 1948–A–MSD–21–5–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court V,  Case 12

Thus, the Tribunal has only partial material at its disposal for judging the case. The defense has been robbed of the opportunity to submit supplementary parts of the documents for correction.

I would like to mention briefly another complication for my case. The Tribunal had granted my motion to call the former commander-in-chief of the navy, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Raeder, as a witness. As former superior of Admiral Schniewind and responsible Chief of SKL, this witness would have been in a position to testify exhaustively and authoritatively concerning all questions at issue. The Control Council, which appears to lend authority to this Tribunal, has refused that the witness Raeder be called. Further more, I have also been informed that because of certain conditions I could not interrogate this witness in Spandau [unclear]. It was left to me to submit questions in wiritng [sic] which would be submitted to the witness after approval by the four Control Council powers. However, as I have my doubys [sic] that the approval of all four powers will be granted before the end of this trial, I was forced to ask for additional witnesses, who as former close associates of the Chief of the Grand Admiral would be in a position to testify on the evidence in question. I would like to request the Tribunal not to evaluate any gaps in my case in chief which might occur because of this to the detriment of my client. I take up my duties as defense counsel for Chief of Naval War Staff Schniewind under the impression that the equality of rights for both parties, so often emphasized by the Prosecution, does not exist; however, I believe that in spite of it I shall succeed to inform the Tribunal of the actual development and events. The facts, however, speak for themselves and – I am firmly convinced of this – in favor of the Admiral.


25 May 1948–A–MSD–21–6–Hoxsie (Weber)
Court V,  Case 12

If the Court will permit me, I will call my first witness, Vice-Admiral Haye.

HELMUTH HAYE, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:

THE PRESIDENT" Witness, you will hold up your right hand.

I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth, that I will withhold and add nothing.

(The witness repeated the oath.)

THE PRESIDENT: You may be seated.



Q Admiral, would you make a pause after each question of mine before you answer so that the interpreter can follow you? Please state your full name to the Tribunal.

A Helmuth Haye.

Q Please spell your surname.

A H-a-y-e.

Q You were an officer of the German Navy?

A Yes.

Q From what time to what period?

A From the 1st of April, 1914, to the end.

Q What was your last rank?

A Vice-Admiral.

Q When and in what position were you working in the OKM?

A From the winter of 1934 to the winter of '39.

Q [W]hat position?

A As I/A of the Flottenabteilung and later in the Operational Department of the SKL.

Q When, for the first time, did the idea of the creation of an SKL emerge?



26 May-A-FL-13-1-Speers (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII


(The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 26 May 1948.)

THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.

MR. NIEDERMANN: If the Court please, I have the photostat now of the document introduced before the IMT and the document introduced here.  I would like to pass them to the court for inspection.

THE PRESIDENT: You may do so.

MR. NIEDERMANN: Apparently there are two documents with the same number. One is a corrected version of this meeting.  The other is another captured version which was not corrected.  The one that we have introduced in evidence is the uncorrected version.  The one before the IMT had hand-written insertions.  I would like to suggest to counsel that if he thinks it important he offer in evidence the other version.

THE PRESIDENT:  Since there are two documents, and since this question has arisen, I would suggest that you have the other document translated, if it has not been done, and photostated, and that it be introduced and reference made back to the other document, And these being the originals, if counsel desires to examine on that document, he may use the original, of course, for the purpose of his examination here today, and he will have the advantage of that and he need not wait for an examination on the other copy of this document until it has been translated and introduced.  You will see that that is done, will you, Mr. Niedermann?

MR. NIEDERMANN: Very well.

DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, may I state in conclusion as far as my questions were concerned, - it doesn't matter which document is considered.  I have merely raised the question because the Prosecution referred to this document submitted to the IMT, also with regard to its certification – and for that reason I regarded it as being the original document.  There is no formal certification as to the authenticity of the other document, and it


26 May-A-FL-13-2-Speers (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

was not quite clear to me up to now that there to different documents involved, but I think that this may be regarded as settled for the time being, till I have inspected the two documents.

MR. NIEDERMANN:  I might also state for the record, if the court please, Dr. Meckel discovered that we had no knowledge that there were two documents.  This is the first time since we have been working in Nurnberg that we have discovered that there are two versions of L-79, of this meeting.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, under those circumstances, I still think the proper thing to do, since this question has been raised, is to introduce both of these documents, and then there can't be any question about it.  Evidently one was a corrected copy and they both may be captured documents.  I suppose there is a certificate on all of these documents.

MR. NIEDERMANN: Yes, there is.

THE PRESIDENT: So that they will be admissible under the certificate.  Very well, you may go ahead, Dr. Meckel.




Q. – We have stopped dealing with the orders in "Fall Weiss", and I will now put to you at the next document, Document D-126 from Document Book XIII-B, Exhibit 1093, page 303 of the German and 180 of the English.  This document contains a time table. Wasn't such a timetable also an indication of the imminence of an operation – the document is C-126.

A. – No, in no way at all. When one of the services worked out orders for a possible operation, then the final item after these preliminary considerations is such a timetable.  If all the preliminary work has arrived at this state, then the orders which had been elaborated can be put away in the drawer, and can be taken from this desk drawer when a decision has been made that the orders have to be carried out.  Such a timetable does not commit itself to a specified date, but starting from an unspeci


26 May-A-FL-13-3-Speers (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

fied D-day – such a day was called D-Day during the invasion of Normandy by the Allied Forces – the last preparations which have yet to be initiated are specified for the days proceeding this D-day, if and when the order for pperations is given.  That is the coping stone for such an order covering a contingency.

Q. – The next document in supplementary Book XIII, NOKW-2882, Exhi-bit 1382, page 121 of the German and 57 of the English, is a directive by the OKM which regards a modification of Case White,  - Fall Weiss.  This communication is signed by you.  What was the reason for this communication?

A. – When the navy, on the strength of the orders issues for Case Whie, had to consider how, organizationally, they had to arrange their measures in case of war with Poland, the first of all prepared themselves for that position which seemed to them most favorable, that is, in this case, assuming that on a certain D-day hostilities will break out, then the navy will endeavor during the hours of darkness, in the early morning of that day, to make the first preparations – first measures, that is, to sow mines before the port of Gdynia.  The OKH or the OKW had learned of these ideas of the navy.  They had certain anxictics in those quarters that by the measures of the navy operational designs of the army might possibly be disturbed.  That is, army operations which were only to be started upon daybreak.  Thereupon, the navy had to relinquish their designs and this order which I have before me issues the appropriate instructions for this.

Q, - Does the wording not clearly reveal that the opening of hostileties was to be started by Germany, that is, the war would be started by the Germand and one would not wait for the breakout of hostilities on the part of Poland?

A. – That cannot be taken from the document without some qualifications.


26 May-A-FL-13-4-Speers (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

These military orders which were prepared for a possible case of war only represent the most favorable solution which we aimed at – the most favorable solution  of military operations, whether that could be realized in that manner depended ultimately on the military and political deveolopments.  For the rest, of course, things were like this.  The first step across the boundary r the first shot fired by anyone in a war is by no means the proper criterion, for determining as to who started the war and as to who is the guilty party.  Perhaps I may remind you in this case of a statement by President Roosevelt of the United States, who in 1941, when apparently he felt himself to be in a similar position, used the metaphor "If during an excursion I see a rattlesnake raising its head to assult me, then I do not wait for this rattlesnake to do so, but I kill it before."


26 May-A-JP-14-1-Gallagher (Int. Weber)
Court No. V   Case XII

Q.  In July 1939 the SKL had conferences with the Foreign Office as to the manner in which actions were to be taken against Polish Merchant shipping.  The Prosecution submitted a document pertaining thereto which bears your signature, directed to the German Foreign Office; NOKW 2731, Supplementary Book XII, Exhibit 1383, page 125 of the German and page 59 of the English.  Will you please make brief comments on this communication?

A.  This communication is signed by me.  It represents a confirmation of certain conferences previously held by some offices of the SKL in the Foreign Office.  I don't know who held these conferences, but I assume the Chief of the Operational Department, or the appropriate expert in the department.  Regarding the document itself, it shows that in the Foreign Office, in accordance  with the implementation order for Operation White, measures concerning economic warfare in the Baltic had been discussed.  Now regarding this conduct of economic warfare, under certain circumstances, political interests were touched upon or were involved, and, therefore, an agreement with the Foreign Office had to be reached.  The measures provided such as they are recorded in this document, are within the framework of international regulations.

Q.  Were such contacts with the Foreign Office on the part of the SKL, were they customary in the SKL?

A.  Such contacts were actually very infrequent, but in the sphere, of course, they had to take place at regular intervals, and they were necessary.  This necessity is clearly shown –

Q.  May I interrupt you, witness.  I believe there was an error in the translation.  It was said that this conference took place " at regular intervals," in the translation.  Did you say so?

A.  No.

Q.  Will you please repeat on what occasions and when such conferences and such contacts took place?

A.  These contacts with the Foreign Office which were very rare, were necessary as a rule when such matters, such as economic warfare, or measures of Naval Warfare, which touched upon political interests, were the


26 May 1948-A-DJG-Gallagher (Weber)  14-2
Court No. V, Case XII

subject of discussions.  Such a contact was necessary from a purely formal point of view because the information of neutral governments was handled by the Foreign Office.

Q  In the next document, that is C-126-E, Exhibit 1092, and NOKW 2196, Exhibit 1097, and NOKW 2761, Exhibit 1385, the first two in Document Book XIII, and the last document in Supplementary Book XIII.

THE PRESIDENT:  What are those three exhibit numbers in their order?

DR. MECKEL: 1092, 1097, and 1385.  The first two are in Document Book XIII-B, English page 189 and 199.  The last document in Supplementary  Book XIII, English page 67.

Q  These three documents have reference to the precautionary dispatch of U-boats, and of merchant shipping and navel forces in the Atlantic.  These measures obviously point to the fact that offensive measures in the West were a lso provided for, don't they?

A  Here again you have a distinction between military offensive measures and measures pertaining to aggressive war.  This here concerns the fact that in a possible case of war, precautions with respect to the enemy had to be made.  That is, that adequate coverage w as secured for the contingency that in the case of war with Poland the Western Powers might declare war upon us.  They were defensive measures which bore an offensive character, because, ultimately, one or two armored pocket battle ships and ten or fifteen submarines were unable to conduct an aggressive war, but their purpose was, in case of the outbreak of hostilities, to relieve our shores – and our home waters – by attracting the attention of the enemy forces, and thus they protected areas close to home waters.  This actually occurred w hen the "Graf Spec", a pocket battleship, in the first months of the war emerged in South Atlantic Waters, and tied down numerous British navel craft until it was hunted down, and dealt with by them.

Q  As a supplement to this, could you tell us for how long the armored pocket battleship Graf Spee engaged enemy navel  forces?


26 May 1948-A-DJG-14-3-Gallagher (Weber)

A  From the outbreak of the war, that is, from the beginning of September until the middle of December, I believe, the 14th or 15th of December, 1939.

Q  I now read from Document C-126-E on page 302 of the German and page 189 of the English.  It regards operational directive for the commitment of Atlantic U-boats, a nd I will read the last sentence:  "This directive is to be destroyed if the operations do not take place at the latest by the 10 October 1939."  What does it me an, and what do you gather from it?

A  I assume that this is a cover letter which was to accompany the operational orders issued to the person in charge of the U-boat flotilla.  From the wording which you have just read to me, it can clearly be disconcerned that at the time of the issuance of these orders one expected that possibly these orders would not be translated into action.

Q  This also merely concerns contingency, doesn't it?

A  Yes, it does.

Q  On 22 August, this conference with Hitler on the Obersalzberg, which has frequently been mentioned here, took place.  Who in addition to you   was present representing the Navy?

A  I was accompanied by, of course, Grandadmiral Raeder, the Commander-in-chief of the Navy.  In a ddition General Admiral Albrecht also attended the conference, Admiral Karls, Admiral Boehm, and possibly some other naval officers as well.

Q  Now during this address, or in the course of this address, was the conflict with Poland mentioned in such a way that it was said the conflict was inevitable and hostilities were imminent?

A  No, in no way at a ll.  Perhaps I may first refer to the testimony which w as made here by Fieldmarshal von Leeb, by General Halder, and by General von Sonenstem, who a lso shared the view that the conference on 22 August 1939 in no way represented the final and irrevocable decision for the start of the war.


26 May 1948-A-DJG-14-4-Gallagher (Weber)

Q  Can you in brief sentences reproduce the gist of his address, such as you recall it?

A  this speech as far as its factual contents were concerned, was in no way different from the one of 23 May.  Here again Hitler went into a great deal of history.  Deference was made to the domestic position in Germany.  When however the whole picture of foreign policy, especially with respect to Poland, was painted much blacker then it had been previously.  As far as I recall it today the sentiments voiced were approximately: "Relations with Poland had become intolerable, somehow there must be a showdown, and it that was necessary, I Hitler, am of the conviction that the Western Powers will not prevent me, particularly not now after the pact with Russia had been concluded."  In this conference we heard for the first time of the conclusion of a pact with Russia which was to take place the next day, or the next day but one.

Q  Did Hitler in this address mention anything about negotiations with Poland?

A  Yes, one of the concluding lines of thought was to the effect that negotiations were being continued.

Q  You believed then that even after this address by Hitler, in the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the tension with Poland, or at any rate, you thought it possible?

A  Yes, quite, but with a certain amount of anxiety, because I thought that Hitler might possibly  misjudge the attitude of the Western Powers regarding the whole complex.  I looked at matters like this:  If the Western Powers in fact are not determined to support Poland to the utmost, then Poland will yield, especially, now that the pact with Russia has been accomplished.  My anxiety was whether Hitler's assumption as to the a ttitude of the Western Powers was actually correct.

Q  Can you briefly tell us what you mean when you say that Poland might then be prepared to give way, in what direction?

A  In the direction that, A:  that the uncompromising anti-German tendency in Poland might change in some way; B:  that negotiations or talks


26 May 1948-A-DJG-14-5-Gallagher (Weber)

about Danzig and the Polish Corridor, which had been unsatisfactory in the Spring of 1939, might possibly be resumed.  This unquestionably might have formed a basis for a complete change in the relationship between Germany and Poland.

Q  How, after the address at the Obersalzberg, did you talk with your Commander-in-chief, Grandadmiral Raeder, concerning this address of Hitler?

A  Yes.  That was at the ar[e]rodrome in Salzburg.  I left for Berlin by air from Salzburg with Grandadmiral Raeder, a nd I asked him about his impression of the speech.

Q  What did Grandadmiral Raeder tell you?

A  Grandadmiral Raeder w as of the view, like myself, that, possibly, the a ttitude of the Western Powers as depicted by Hitler, in the matters of the settlement of the Polish question, might possibly have been misjudged.  For the rest, he w as of the opinion that Hitler in all circum-stances would find ways a nd means again to re ach a peaceful solution.

Q  And he explicitly communicated that to you as his own view?

A  Yes, he did.


26 May-A-IL-15-2-Gallagher (Int. Weber)
Court V Case XII

frankly I don't know that they have much weight.

MR. NIEDERMAN:  I might add also, that there was considerable testimony before both the IMT and here, I believe, concerning the accuracy of those notes.

THE PRESIDENT:  I was going to state that there has been a good deal of testimony here about what took place, and somebody wrote this down.  About all the versions, just what took place, and we will have to figure it out as best we can.  I think that we will let them stand for whatever weight they may have as to what did take place.


Q  Now, Admiral, when did you realize that there would be a war?

A  My doubts as to the actual occurrence of war had not been removed until finally war broke out.  Particularly, there were doubts when suddenly a stop was put to marching orders, which already had been issued on 15 August, and at the same time we learned that apparently Great Britain and Italy were trying to reach some compromise.  My doubts had been finally dissipated when the marching order for 1st of September was not rescinded, and the first shots were fired.


26 May-A-IL-15-1-Gallagher (Int. Weber)

Q  Yes.

A  And he expressed, moreover, that on account of this anxiety which he felt, he wanted to talk with Hitler at all costs in order to communicate to Hitler his own view regarding the Western Powers, because, he himself regarded the position in such a light that without wanting to, Hitler might possibly slide into a serious war with the Western Powers.

DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, in this connection I would like to refer to two exhibits submitted by the Prosecution regarding this case.  They are typewritten pages which bear no signature, and do not show the originator.  At the time, upon presentation of these documents, they are Exhibits Nos. 1101 and 1102, it was ruled by the court that these documents had not been properly identified, but they would be admitted subject to that objection.  I don't know whether a more specific identification has taken place on the part of the Prosecution.  The ruling was made on 27 February.  Exhibits 1101 and 1102 ; it is Document Book XIII.  May I submit two photostatic copies to the Tribunal.  I will submit the 2 photostats to the Tribunal right now

THE PRESIDENT:  Do you have any idea where they came from, Mr. Niedermann?

MR. NIEDERMAN:  Is it document 798-PS?


MR. NIEDERMAN:  Before the IMT there were two versions of this, in fact, there were three versions of the same meaning offered by various members of the Prosecution.  These two were admitted, but the third version, which was C—3, I believe was denied.  The IMT at the time said that they were apparently captured notes, and in the judgment they said they were sure that they were authentic, and therefore were admitted in evidence.  The IMT judgment, I think, specifically mentioned these two documents.

THE PRESIDENT:  I think on that subject that they will stand.  They were evidently captured documents, or notes of some sort, and so


26 May-A-IL-16-1-Goldberg (Int. Weber)

Q  Was the Navy, in your view, prepared for a conflict with the West, that is, a conflict which you and Grand Admiral Raeder thought was imminent?

A  No, in no way at all.

Q  Can you give the Tribunal a short survey of our naval forces with which, on the first of September, 1939, we had to wage war against the united naval forces of France and Great Britain?

A  We started this war with two heavy battleships, with some kind of benevolence you might call them battleships – with three armored pocket battleships, one heavy cruiser, six light cruisers, approximately 15 to 20 destroyers, about as many torpedo boats and approximately 35 submarines of which only ten to 12 were suitable and available for use on the high seas.  Now, the British, as far as I recall it at that time opposed us with about 15 high-grade battleships, four or five battle cruisers, I guess about a dozen heavy cruisers.

Q  May I interrupt you?

DR. MECKEL:  May I give a statistical chart to the Tribunal which I will later present as evidence within the presentation of my case?  It is to facilitate the Tribunal's comprehension.

A  (Continuing)  About 50 to 60 light cruisers – that is what the British had --- more than 100 destroyers, 50 to 60 submarines.

Q  Thank you.  T hat is enough.  Is it true, as the Prosecution contended, that the navy entered the war with great enthusiasm and that they were   entitled to enter it with great enthusiasm?

A  No.  On the contrary, we had a heavy heart because   in   view of the tasks of war which seemed well nigh impossible of achievement, there was no prospect of achieving any decisive successes.

JUDGE HALE:  May I interrupt?  You didn't mention the naval forces of France.  She also had a considerable navy, did she not, Admiral?

THE WITNESS:  Yes.  France had quite a considerable navy which, by itself, was superior to our forces.  France also possessed two or three high grade battle cruisers, the Strassbourg of the Dunkirk


26 May-A-IL-16-2-Goldberg (Int. Weber)

(Dunkerque) Class, there were battleships of the Richelieu Class in the last stages of construction, which were by far superior to our battleships.  As to the number of cruisers I can't give you any definite figures now.  The French flotilla of destroyers and above all their submarine flotilla was substantially larger than ours.


Q  Now, from the subsequent period the Prosecution has submitted as evidence excerpts from SKL war diaries.  I'd like to put a few questions to you in order to elucidate the significance of the war diaries, before dealing with the further events of the war.  What purpose did the war diary serve?

A  Perhaps I may first make a concluding remark regarding my last answer.  Characteristic of the attitude of the navy and of the chief of the SKL regarding the war which had now broken out, was a remark which Grand Admiral Raeder made when on the day when Britain and France declared war on Germany he had a consultation with Hitler.  On this occasion he said, "The contribution of the navy in this war will only be slight, but the navy will fight and if necessary they will know how to perish in honor."  That is just in conclusion of my previous statement.  May I ask you now to repeat your question, sir?

Q  What purpose did the war diary serve?

A  The war diary was to be used for later historical research.  It was to record the course of all the events of the war, and with comprehensive appendices and appropriate elucidations it was also to record what considerations and what developments prompted certain decisions.

Q  Did the wary diary also contain orders?

A  No.  the war diary did not contain orders.  For the elucidation of events, excerpts from orders were included or attached as appendices to the war diary.  The war diary did not consist only of one volume which merely described the events, but it contained voluminous appendices about all theatres of war, about major events of the war such as


26 May-A-IL-16-3-Goldberg (Int. Weber)

Operation Sea Lion, the submarine warfare, the Mediterranean theatre, the Atlantic theatre and the individual experts of the SKL furnished the person who compiled the war diary with their contributions.  A very informative part was formed by the Enclosure D to the wary diary in which all incoming intelligence from the Secret Service, from the radio monitoring and radio decoding service had been included.

Q  Can you briefly tell us something about the so-called B Service, the so-called decoding service?  What were its tasks and what achievements did our decoding service accomplish?

A  The radio decoding service dealt, as the name suggests, with the observation, the monitoring of enemy radio communications.  It recorded enemy radio communications and tried to decode intercepted radio messages.

Q  Will you please explain what you mean by decoding?

A  The military radio service generally – I think I may assume that this is well known – does not convey messages by the use of ordinary language but it conveys messages in cipher and it is a very special art to break the cipher system of the enemy.

Q  T hank you.  that is enough.  Now, briefly, how far had our deciphering service got?  Were we able to read enemy communications?

A  Until about the middle of 1940 we had an almost exhaustive insight into all of the radio communications of France.  By certain codes of which we had the key, that were codes in frequent use, we were able to almost exhaustively monitor the British radio communications, particularly in the fiels of   radio communications between merchant ships and we also knew the key to the code used by the British Navy.

Q  And these reports about decoded communications?

A  T hey were used in the wary diary as appendices.

Q  Who wrote the war diary?

A  Until the beginning of October 1939, an expert in the SKL, whom I no longer recall by name, and from October 1939 Assman who either held the rank of Kapitaenleutnant or Korvettenkapitaen.


26 May-A-IL-16-4-Goldberg (Int. Weber)

Q  Did this expert write the text of this war diary upon his own initiative and under his own responsibility or did he write it upon a special order or upon dictation?

A  This author of the war diary participated in all situation conferences held by the commander-in-chief of the navy.  The events which he recorded in the war diary, he usually derived from his own information but not infrequently, of course, he was ordered to include one statement or the other in his war diary.

Q  Thank you.  How often did you see the war diary and how often did you initial it?

A  I estimate that I saw it once a week, possibly at shorter intervals, possibly also at longer intervals, I regularly initialled it.

Q  Did you ever examine as to whether every word was correct?

A  In view of the volume of the wary diary and the other claims upon me in the SKL that was impossible.

Q  May I interrupt you?  Can you tell us approximately what volume the entries, say, comprised in one week, that is, the interval at which you initialled it and looked through it?  Can you tell us the approximate volume of one week?

A  One week probably had about 150 pages.

Q  Would you like to make any additional comments as to how far you examined it?

A  No.  Of course in this examination  you could only test certain samples.  For the rest, the volumes containing the appendices to the war diary were not even submitted to me nor was that necessary because the more important information was submitted to me when it was received.

Q  One more question:  T he war diary frequently mentions situation conferences with the chief of the SKL, the chief of the Soekriegsleitung.  What significance did these situation conferences have which were held at the chief of the Soekriegsleitung, that is, at Grand Admiral Raeder's?

A  During the war daily situation conferences took place with the 


26 May-A-16-5-Goldberg (Int. Weber)
Court V  Case XII

commander-in-chief of the navy.  That was in the morning at ten o'clock after the operational department of the SKL had previously screened and dealt with all reports which had received during the night.  These situation conferences basically formed the foundation for all decisions of the commander-in-chief of the navy and only on very few occasions or at times of special strain or special operations did special oral reports take place with the commander-in-chief in addition to these situation conferences.  That was the case during the Bismarck operation, and during the Norwegian Operation.  Then it did occur that the commander-in-chief was informed every three hours or every five hours or every six hours.


26 May 48-17-1-A-AEH-Goldberg (Weber)

Q.  I will now refer to the Norwegian campaign.  How did the preparations and plannings for the occupation of Norway come about?  When did you hear of it for the first time?

A. The position in the Scandinavian area had always been followed by us with particular vigilance from the very outset of the war because the Scandinavian area was of great importance to us, to our economy and our war industries, because from Sweden we got most of the ores which we needed.  These ores, during the summer months, were shipped to Germany via the Baltic Sea; in the winter months when the Bottnian Gulf was frozen they were shipped via Narvik, via the North Sea.  This importance of Scandinavia for Germany's conduct of the war was, of course, well known in the camp of our opponents.  it was a matter of course that we in the SKL were very suspicious and paid great attention to the fact that these communications to Scandinavia were preserved and were not disturbed.  And the first anxieties in this respect already cropped up as early as the first month of war when we learned that a special activity of the enemy secret service was to be noted in Norway.  Special reasons for misgivings were not furnished by these reports as yet but at any rate they provided a motive for increased vigilance.

Q.  What was the reason for the SKL to deal with the case of Norway, in theory?

A. In the first days of October, Grand Admiral Raeder gave me a letter from Admiral Karls and at the same time the mission to investigate the military angles of the problems which had been touched upon in this letter.  I still recall the general tenor of this letter.  Admiral Karls had apparently received similar warnings about Norway.  In his letter he described the dangers which might result if enemy actions in the Scandinavian area might materialize.  A further trend of thought contained in this letter was that under certain circumstances one might gain possession of certain bases in Norway with Russian help or Russian pressure because if we possessed certain bases in Norway, then our opponent would be unable to obtain possession of Norway.  Admiral Raeder gave me the mission to


26 May 48-17-2-A-AEH-Goldberg (Weber)

study this question in the SKL as to whether in fact the possession of any bases in Norway would be of military profit to us and this examination took place in the SKL.

Q.  Were those the considerations which you found in the record of the war diary of the 3 October?  I refer to the Document which the Prosecution used as C-122, Exhibit 1117, Book XIV, on Page 86 of the German and 37 of the English.  (Document handed to witness.)  Do you recall this entry?

A. Of course I no longer recalled the entry as such, but when I saw it again here all the connections became clear to me once again.  It says excerpt from the war diary, that Grand Admiral Raeder, the Chief of the SKL, thought it necessary to familiarize Hitler, as soon as possible, with the considerations about the Scandinavian and the Norwegian area.  This is followed by certain questions, for which illustrations are given, as to what places in Norway might be considered as strong points, and so forth.

Q.  Admiral, that is quite enough.  It is all contained in the document.  Now, how do you account for the fact that in this entry the anxiety that Britain might intervene in Norway is not raised in this document, but merely the question of bases is touched upon?

A. In the war diary of course the topic is only treated in as far as Admiral Raeder had given a specific order.  That is the military angle of this problem.

Q.  But you recall with certainty that at this time the premise that was started from was that Britain might possibly gain a footing in the area.  That is what you stated   before, wasn't it?

A. There is no doubt about it.  This anxiety about Britain was the mainspring of everything.

Q.  General, in this connection I will submit evidence within the course of my presentation, the affidavit of the former Kapitan Zur See Assmann, who at that time compiled the war diary of one SKL and was present at the conference.  It is SKL 302 which I will offer at a later stage.

You said before that from other sources too you had received information


16 May 48-17-3-A-AEH-Goldberg (Weber)

about an imminent invasion of Norway, from agents.  Now, from what sources did you derive this information and from whom?

A.  In addition to the sources which I named, the direct reports by agents directed to Admiral Karls, we also received warnings which were channeled to us from Admiral Canaris foreign intelligence office, and Grand Admiral Raeder was particularly cautious here because the same warnings were received from two different sources.

Q.  Now, what was the attitude of the SKL regarding this idea, the occupation of Norway or the securing of bases in Norway.  Was it regarded as advantageous or was it regarded as disadvantageous?  What was their position?

A.  The view of the SKL was to this effect:  Of course, through a seizing of certain bases in Norway certain profits might be derived but in the first place these profits, looking at them from the military point of view, were rather problematical, but other considerations led to the fact that an action in Norway was not considered by us as being merely advantageous but that it might also imply grave dangers, because if we were entrenched in Norway then it was a matter of course that Norway was no longer neutral for our enemy.  Norway would become a theatre of war, and in view of the superiority of the British naval forces it was to be expected that the trade traffic along the Norwegian coast would very soon be stopped if we were lodged in Norway.


26 May-A-MW-18-1-Love (Int. Weber)

Therefore, the SKL arrived at the final result that the best solution would be if there remained as they were at the outbreak of war, that is, that Norway was to remain neutral and that this neutrality, of course, had to be strictly respected by both parties making due allowance for the rules of neutrality which had been established by Norway.

Q.  Will you briefly tell us what those Norwegian rules for neutrality were?

A. The Norwegian rules for the Norwegian neutrality were in conformity with the customary rules for neutrality for Naval warfare, largely speaking, and in the angles which are of interest here, it provided that both parties were to be allowed to call a trade traffic in the territorial waters of Norway, the peaceful passage through Norwegian territorial waters of Norway, the peaceful passage through Norwegian territorial waters was to be open to warships and to auxiliary war vessels and to ships flying the Reichsdienstflagge.  Radio communication was prohibited in Norwegian territorial waters.

Q.  May I interrupt you.  I think there was a misunderstanding here.  You said ships flying the Reichsdienstflagge, but the translation “auxiliary vessels” was adequate and already covered this point.  Will you please explain what the term ships flying the Reichsdienstflagge connotes? 

A. I believe that the term warship is known.  In addition to warships every nation in war also has former merchant shipping which was reconverted into warshipping, and among them were for instance auxiliary cruisers.  In addition every navy also had for instance certain supply vessels which did not fly the war ensign but a special flag which designated their nationality.  I don't know how matters were handled in the American Navy but I can illustrate it by citing the British Navy.  The British Navy war flag is the white ensign and the British commercial flag in the red ensign, and the Reichadienstflagge of England is the blue ensign, this, the service emblem of the British


26 May-A-MW-18-2-Love (Int. Weber)

ships and thus we also had a service emblem analogous to the British blue ensign, that is the Reichsdienstflagge.

Q.  Can you name a ship which played a part in the Norwegian problem which would come under that category?

A.  I thought it was necessary to clarify this question quite unequivocably.  It was the vessel Altmark which in the middle of February was raided by British warships in Norwegian territorial waters bore the German Reich service ensign, the Reichsdienstflagge.

Q.  You have just described the position taken by the SKL regarding the idea of Admiral Karls, concerning  a counter measure in Norway.  You have made clear the position of the SKL.  Now what happened afterwards?

A. The SKL or the personnel office by order of the Chief of the SKL sent a Naval attaché to our Legation in Oslo so that from there he might be in a position to observe clearly the development of the situation and convey the news of it to us.

Q.  Who was this navel attaché?

A. Korvettenkapitaan Schreiber was the naval attaché.

Q.  Your Honor, in the scope of my presentation I will submit an affidavit by this Naval Attaché.  Therefore, I will not go into details at this stage.  The opinion of the SKL was submitted to the Chief of the SKL and what steps did he take?

A. The Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy still thought this matter important enough to have it reported to Hitler because this was not merely a military question or a question of war industry and armament but if ever one had to expect the contingency of Britain lodging herself in Norway then much graver results might ensue.  Britain in Norway mean that the whole country would be used and was available as a basis for the British conduct of war; that the routes through the Kattegat and Skaggerak were blocked to us and one might even consider it quite possible that even the other part of the Scandinavian peninsula, that is Sweden, might at some stage pass into the British Orbit,


26 May-A-MW-18-3-Love (Int. Weber)

either it might be that one supply from the eastern coast of Sweden would be denied to us or that Sweden might join the Western powers which meant the revival of war in the Baltic Sea but in a much more aggravated manner that we had had it at the outbreak of war, and in the view of the Chief of the SKL this might mean losing the war.  For that reason Grand Admiral Raeder thought it necessary to inform the Fuehrer about these connections.

Q.  Were you present when this oral report was made?

A. No, the report was made by Grand Admiral Raeder alone.

Q.  Do you know the substance of this oral report?

A. Grand Admiral Raeder, - he informed me later about this, - during his oral report closely adhered to the memorandum of the SKL which had been made upon his order regarding these matters which culminated in the conclusions that they were dangerous, and military advantages would be slight; that even if we were in  Norway one could not predict with 100 per cent certainty that trade communications with Norway could be sustained.

Q.  Your Honor, I will submit to the Tribunal in this connection, the documents SKL 308 and 303, one is a war diary entry about these events.  The second an affidavit of the then Naval Adjutant to Hitler, Frigattenkapitaen von Putkarmer.  Did Grand Admiral Raeder tell you about Hitler's reaction and his view on these questions?

A. Yes, on the next day he informed me and the experts of the SKL about it during the situation conference; he said that Hitler had been much impressed but the subject matter had been completely strange to him; a decision had not been made; Hitler had stated that he would have to think this matter over.

Q.  Were these questions further dealt with in the SKL or was there an interruption in dealing with these matters?

A. In the SKL subsequently nothing happened at first and this matter remained in abeyance inasmuch as nothing was done on our part, but


26 May-A-MW-18-4-Love (Int. Weber)

news warnings continuously reached us from the agents.

Q.  You already said they came via agents.  Were there other sources too?

A. Yes, from the Naval Attaché we had in Oslo and to whom I have already referred and a revival of this whole problem occurred in the first half of December when the Norwegian politician Quisling appeared on the scene.

Q.  When was that?

A. That must have been in the first third-about the 10th of December.

Q.  Were you present during the conversations of Quisling with Grand Admiral Raeder?

A. No, I was not present but I learned that Quisling had been introduced to Grand Admiral Raeder by Rosenberg and that Quisling afterwards in talking to Grand Admiral Raeder gave a similar dangerous account of the position such as we had previously received as the result of the news from agents.

Q.  Did you ever come into contact with Quisling?

A.  Not at that time.

Q.  At another point of time?

A. In the summer of 1932 I once, as expert of the Fleet Staff (Hottenstab) was in Oslo on board the flagship and at that time the officers of this ship were his guests because he was the War Minister of Norway at the time.

Q.  In the documents a certain Hagelin is also mentioned.  Did you hear of him?

A. No, I think I only learned his name in connection with the trials.  I have never seen him nor spoken to him.

THE PRESIDENT:  At this time we will take a recess for fifteen minutes.

(A recess was taken.)  


26 May-A-MW-20-1- Sampson (Int. Schaeffer)

THE MARSHAL:  The Tribunal is again in session.


Mr. President, I would like to submit a chart for the information of the Tribunal because this chart is not quite adequate for the treatment of the Norwegian problem.

Q.  Admiral, before the recess we talked about Quisling's visit to Grand Admiral Raeder.  In the Indictment it is asserted that you were in touch with and kept in touch with Quisling.  What can you tell us about that?

A.  I neither had personal contact nor did I keep up such contact with Quisling.

Q.  The Prosecution further asserts that at that time you were in very close touch with General Warlimont of the OKW, is that correct?

A.  As far as I can recollect, I had never any official or private contact with General Warlimont.  That not only refers to this particular question – I had not contact with him at all.

Q. Do you know what Grand Admiral Raeder initiated after Quisling's visit?

A.  Raeder regarded Quisling's news as being significant enough to necessitate a contact between Quisling and Hitler, so that Quisling could tell Hitler personally his ideas and worries.

Q. When did that happen?

A.  That must have been on either the 11th or the 12th or the 13th of December, 1939; that meeting must have taken place on one of these days. 

Q. Do you know what Raeder's view was of Quisling and his statements?

A.  The information which Quisling brought to us was quite consistent with other information sources.  It was significant, of course, and interesting that now, completely separated from all former channels of information, a Norwegian politician transmitted the same type of news.


26 May-A-MW-20-1-Sampson (Int. Schaeffer)

I know, however, that Grand Admiral Raeder told Hitler at the time, and that was before Quisling visited him, that one had to be rather careful, in evaluating Quisling's statements and news.  Quisling after all was a politician  and a Norwegian party functionary.  One would never be quite sure whether or not with such information he wanted to further personal or party aims.

Q.  On that occasion did Raeder once again talk about the whole problem of Norway to Hitler?

A.  Yes.  He once again summarized the whole problem and spoke to Hitler about it.  He talked very clearly and objectively about the advantages and the dangers.

Q.  What dangers?

A.  Dangers inasmuch that in the event of the seizure or the occupying of Norway by England, our situation would become extremely dangerous.  For the rest that even if we occupied certain bases the situation need not be satisfactory.  The situation after all was this:  If the British were in Norway, it was certain that we would not get any ore from Norway.  No, if we were in Norway it would mean that for a certain period, either a longer or shorter period, we would possibly get some ore.  If none of the two parties was in Norway, and, if Norway were to remain neutral, then it was quite certain that we would get ore.

Q.  Do you know whether after Raeder's report in December Hitler took any steps?

A.  No.  Hitler at that time decided to take charge  of the whole problem of Norway himself and to deal with all questions connected with this problem with a special working staff which was to be subordinated to him personally.

Q.  Did you in the SKL gain knowledge of this work which was to be carried out by this special staff?

A.  We did not receive any current information; for quite sometime we didn't know anything at all.  I know that at the end of 1939 and the


26 May-A-MW-20-3-Sampson (Int. Schaeffer)

beginning of 1940 on Raeder's request, I once again made an exhaustive study about the whole Norwegian problem and this study was transmitted to the OKW and it possibly ended up in this working staff which was especially created for this purpose.

Q.  But you cannot give any detailed information about the work that went on in the OKW?

A.  No.  I am not informed about that.

Q.  It's asserted in the Indictment that in the SKL a working staff was created as well, under your direction.  What can you tell us about that?

A.  That is not correct.  The study which I mentioned just now was dealt with by the responsible experts in the normal course of business routine.  There was no special working staff for Norwegian matters.

Q.  According to the available information, the Study North of the OKW was received by your office on the 10thoif January, 1940.  What considerations were expressed in this study?

A.  This study, as far as I can say today in retrospect, was an exposition of the whole Norwegian problem, approximately along the same lines as it was regarded by the SKL.  Dangers, advantages and disadvantages of an occupation were discussed.

Q.  Now, what developments occurred later?

A.  Towards the middle or end of January, Hitler and the OKW, at least those subordinated to him, must have created the Working Staff Norway or North, whatever it was called; and, this working staff consisted of members of all branches of the services; a naval officer was also a member of the staff.  That was Captain Kranke.

DR. MECKEL:  Mr. President, I am going to submit to the Tribunal an affidavit executed by one naval Captain Kranke, SKL No. 301.

Q.  Was any other work carried out in the SKL that concerned the Norwegian plans or any plans concerned with Norway?

A. In the SKL nothing further was initiated or dealt with in this 


26 May-A-MW-20-4-Sampson (Int. Schaeffer)


Q.  Did you have any contact with Captain Kranke?

A.  A connection with the OKW Norwegian staff and the SKL was of course given because of Capt. Kranke being the liaison; in order to carry out his task he needed certain information which the SKL could give him, as for instance, if an operation resulted, how many ships would be available; what ships, how many soldiers could be accommodated, etc.

Q.  On whose initiative was the Norwegian matter expedited?

A.  I have no exhaustive knowledge of this, but according to all the impressions which Captain Kranke transmitted at the time, apparently Hitler was the instigating factor in the Norwegian matter after he realized the significance of the Norwegian problem.

Q.  Did Hitler later on consult Grand Admiral Raeder in any way?

A.  Yes.  As far as I know, Grand Admiral Raeder visited Hitler several times during the subsequent period.

Q.  Were you present during these discussions?

A.  No, I wasn't.

Q.  What opinion did Raeder express to Hitler during these discussions?

A.  For all practical purposes it was always the same opinion which Raeder expressed to Hitler.  He wanted to prevent Hitler being too one-sidely optimistic in reference to this whole matter.

Q.  Thank you; that suffices.

DR. MECKEL:  I shall submit to the Tribunal a memorandum about an oral report by Raeder to Hitler in February, 1940.  That will be part of my evidence.


26 May 48-21-1-A-AEH-Sampson ( Schaeffer)

Q.  In the meantime, did any events occur which might indicate either a violation of neutrality on the part of Norway or an imminent intervention on the part of England?

A.  Both occurred.  More and more news arrived concerning activities of French and British agents in Norway, and, during the whole of the time, since the beginning of the war, almost since the beginning of the war, or, at any rate since the ore traffic to Germany had to be channeled via Narvik, that must have been since approximately the middle of November, 1939, there was a constant series of British transgressions into Norwegian sovereign waters, directed against German shipping.  One thus gained the impression that on the part of the Norwegians not sufficient energetic action was put up against this British behavior.  This culminated in the incident of the tanker Altmark which has just been mentioned.

Q.  Will you briefly describe for us the Altmark incident?

A.  This tanker Altmark was an auxiliary vessel of the battleship Admiral Graf Spee.  When the Graf Spee was sunk in the southern Atlantic, in the middle of December, the tanker Altmark was called back to Germany.  The ship succeeded in taking the northern route between Denmark, and reaching the Arctic Sea and to reach Norwegian territorial waters near Tronhjem.

Q.  Could you give us the route again?

A.  The ship succeeded in coming from the southern Atlantic, passing into the North Atlantic Sea between Iceland and Greenland, and reaching the Norwegian coast near Trondhjem, where she was in Norwegian territorial waters.  In the Norwegian territorial waters it directed its course towards the south:  the ship bore the Reichadionstflagge, equivalent of the British blue onsign flown by auxiliary naval vessels.  Apparently some news about the passage of this ship was transmitted to English; that might very easily have happened through code communications; with the result that when the ship loft the Norwegian territorial waters near Stavanger, south of Berge, constant touch was kept with this tanker Altmark, first of all by planes and later by British destroyers.  These followed the tanker, 


26 May 48-21-2- A-AEH- S mpson ( Schaeffer)

first of all keeping outside the territorial waters.

Q.  May I interrupt.  The tankers was outside the territorial waters -- or where?

A.  The tanker moved within the territorial waters, but the British destroyers followed the course of the tanker moving, for the time being, outside the territorial waters.  During the further trip south, the British destroyers clearly approached the tanker, and, not disturbed by the presence of two small Norwegian torpedo boats, attempted to press the tanker Altmark outside the Norwegian territorial waters.  In that situation the tanker Altmark took refuge in the Gjoorsing Fjord on the southern coast of Norway.  Again, without taking notice of the Norwegian torpedo boats, one of the British destroyers followed the tanker Altmark into the Fjord, and send armed crows on board the tanker.  Members of the German civilian crews went overboard and, I may say in this connection that the Fjord was frozon; and, the members of the crew who went overboard tried to escape over the ice.  They were shot at.  Seven of the members of the crew who were trying to escape were killed.  After the British destroyer had liberated the prisoners who were on board the tanker Altmark, (they originated from the Graf Spee battleship,) the British destroyer left.  There can be no question that that was a plain breach of neutrality.

Q.  And when did this take place?

A.  That was the middle of February, 1940.

Q.  What was the attitude of the Norwegian Government to this incident?

A.  As a whole, I believe the Norwegian government maintained the same attitude as we did, and a strong protest was lodged on the part of the Norwegian government to England.

DR. MECKEL:  Mr. President, in this connection I am going to submit Document SKL-315 which contains the attitude of the Norwegian Foreign Minister about the Altmark incident; further, Document SKL-316, an excerpt from the war diary which deals with the Altmark affair.

Q.  Do you know what impression our diplomatic representatives gained  


26 May 48-21-3- A-AEH-Sampson ( Schaeffer)

in Oslo about the resistance of the Norwegian Government?

A.  Our representatives in Oslo expressed their attitude to the following effect:  Norway would not be capable or at any rate not willing to maintain its neutrality.

Q.  Could you repeat the last sentence?

A.  Our representatives in Oslo expressed their opinion to the effect that the Norwegian Government apparently was not capable or willing effectively to protect and defend Norway's neutrality.

Q.   Therefore did you gain knowledge of any other breaches of neutrality? 

A.  Around the period of time which I mentioned earlier, from the middle of November until February and March, of the next year, there was a series of breaches of neutrality.

MR. DOBBS :  If Your Honors please, I don't quite see just to what extent certain breaches of neutrality would affect the actions of the SKL or of the German navy -- not confining it to my particular department -- would have after these certain other plans had gone through on the part of the navy.  These were subsequent actions.

 DR. MECKEL:  Mr. President, I believe --

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, the Tribunal is of the view that those plans hadn't culminated until action was taken, and, while the Tribunal would like to have him be as brief as possible, why the objection, we think, is not good.  It's overruled.


No further comments are necessary about this problem.  I shall submit evidence concerning it.

Q.  When was the preparatory work of the so-called working staff North in the OKW transformed into a concrete order?

A.  In the first days of March, from the working Staff North, there arrived the first operational directive; I believe that is what it was called.  


16 May 48-21-4-A-AEH-Sampson (Schaeffer)

Q.  Did this directive contain – I beg your pardon.  Another question first.  What was this directive called?

A.  I believe in that directive it was expressed for the first time in writing that Wesermunde was to be the code name of an operation directed against Scandinavia; if such an operation would come about.

Q.  Did that directive contain a introductory reasoning?

A.  Here again there was a preamble, a notation, approximately to the effect that the situation might necessitate certain measures to be taken in Scandinavia.


26 May-A-IL-22- 1-Spears (Int. Schaeffer)

Q  Was this directive already an order for attack, or did it just mention preparations, or what was it?

A   It was not yet an order.  It was merely a preparatory expression of certain measures which would be taken.  

Q   What were the missions of the navy in this directive?

A   The navy had been assigned the task, according to this directive, to secure entry into the intended landing localities and to make sure that the necessary occupation troops would be transported to these areas.

Q   How did the navy regard the execution of this mission?

A   The navy was of the opinion that such an operation directed towards the north, particularly towards Trondhjem and Narvik would be connected with considerable risks.  T he long flank march very near the British coast could, in view of the strength of the British naval power, easily lead to serious setbacks.

Q   In this particular direction of the OKW there is some mention of the occupation of Denmark.  Now, from whom did the idea originate?  

A   The SKL was very surprised at the inclusion of the occupation of Denmark in the order.  A necessity of such an action could not be understood by the SKL and also by Grand Admiral Raeder, at least, not in accordance with the original ideas.  Later on I learned that the inclusion of an occupation of Denmark into these plans was to be traced back to requests of the air force.  This branch of the service held the opinion that bases in Denmark could not be done without if the operation Norway had to be carried out.

Q   After these directives were received, did the SKL voice any misgivings against the execution of this plan, and, if so, for what reason?

A  The opinions within the SKL were from the very beginning until the end always somewhat divided.  This was the case because many of the responsible experts were of the opinion that the risks of such a commitment were not in a proper proportion to the prospects or success.


26 May-A-IL-22- 2-Spears (Int. Schaeffer)

Q  Admiral, I will now pass to you an excerpt from the war diary of the SKL, that is, Document NOKW-2265, Document Book XLV, Exhibit 1124, page 130 of the German text, and page 60 of the English text.  These are entries about a situation conference with the chief of the SKL, and the date is the second and the fourth of March 1940.  What is revealed in these entries.

A  The substance of this entry is that apparently the SKL or the man who initiated the entry held the view that all military problems and worries, etc., strategic matters are at stake.  The misgivings which had been voiced up until then, particularly with respect to the military risk, would now have to recede into the background.

Q  Who was commissioned by Hitler to carry out the Norwegian operation?

A  The man in charge of the working staff was General von Falkonhorst.  He was also to be in charge of the operation if it became necessary.

Q  Did you receive the operational order from Falkenhorst?

A  Yes, it came into one possession.

Q  When?

A  Approximately on the 5th of March.

Q  What did the SKL initiate in accordance with the Fuehrer directive?

A  On the basis of this Fuehrer directive and of this operational order, -- “Wesermuende”.  The SKL gave the corresponding directives to the subordinate agencies of the navy.

Q  Did at that time the SKL receive any information from radio reconnaissance, and if so, what type of information?

A  Radio reconnaissance was a very good source of information, and it was particularly valuable because it rendered a very objective confirmation of news which had originated from other sources, and with regard to which news one might have held some doubts at one time or another.  This radio monitoring service, particularly in the Norwegian matter,


26 May-A-IL-22- 3-Spears (Int. Schaeffer)

confirmed that some kind of the movements from the British coast, northern Scottish ports, were being planned and prepared.

Q  Do you happen to know of any designations of these plans from this radio service?  

A  Yes, particularly the British code names “Havenforth” and “Stratford” have remained in my memory.  Those were the code names of the forces which were to go to Norway, and the subtitles of “Stratford” were A, B, C, D, and those designated the objectives which were to be reached by certain groups within these forces.

Q  Where was this information collected that came in about such matters?

A  Finally after having passed through certain agencies which had to be informed, they were collected as enclosures to the war diary.

Q  Now, this particular fact, the “Stratford” and “Havenforth” plans which you just mentioned, was that later confirmed in any other manner?

A  After the execution of the Norwegian operation had started, and after skirmishes had taken place with the British troops, which had already landed, we found in the possession of the landed troops heaps of documents which gave a clear confirmation of the fact that the information transmitted by agents, as well as the radio information had been correct with reference to the misgivings which the SKL had had.

Q  Did you yourself see these captured orders which you have just mentioned?  

A  Yes, I saw them myself.

DR. MECKEL:  If the Tribunal please, I shall submit these captured orders in evidence, as well as an excerpt from the war diary which makes reference to these captured orders.  They are contained in Document Book III of the defense for Schiewind.  Unfortunately, I am not able to get the information from the decoding because that is contained in that part of the war diary which is not available to me.


26 May-A-IL-22-4-Spears (Int. Schaeffer)
Court  V  Case  XII

About the fact that this information was available from the coding service, I am going to submit an affidavit from Captain Assmann.


Q  Now, to the best of your knowledge of the situation, what was the situation at the time when the order for the occupation of Norway of the 9th of April was issued – did you think that an intervention of the part of England was imminent?

A  Here I have to make a rather lengthy statement because at the time immediately before the occupation of Norway the situation varied.  Until the first half of the month of March, approximately the 5th or the 10th of March the picture had been completely clear to us.  We knew that intentions to land would very shortly be realized, and according to the picture of the situation which we had, these intentions were to be carried out under the pretext of aid for Finland.


26 May 48-23-1-AEH-Gallagher (Schaeffer)

Finland at that time was engaged in a war with Russia.  Approximately around the 10th or 15th of March an armistice was concluded between Finland and Russia, and that meant that this pretext could no longer be used for a landing in Norway by the British or by the French.  Prior to this time the tension had already become so acute that Hitler urged the immediate carrying-out of the Norwegian operation.  That, however, had somewhat abated, but already during the last ten days of March, the activity of the enemy increased again.  The picture gained by the radio monitoring service showed alarming proportions, and rendered the impression that an operation on the part of the British and French against Norway was imminent.  The activity of agents had of course never abated throughout the whole month of March.

Q.  What measures of the enemy became externally apparent which supplemented this picture?

A.  During the first days of March a mine operation by the British took place in Norwegian territorial waters.

Q.  I beg your pardon, when was that?

A.  During the first days of April.

Q.  Well, I believe you said March?

A.  I correct myself, during the first days of April the British carried out a mine operation in Norwegian territorial waters, which in the opinion of the SKL was clearly directed against pressing peaceful merchant navy traffic out of territorial waters, thus making it accessible to British forces.  on the whole we regarded this however as tactical preparatory act as against further outstanding measures.

Q.  At that time our movements had already started, hadn't they?

A.  At the time when the mine operation took place, our operations had already started from the home ports.

Q.  Therefore, this mine operation can no longer be regarded as having been the cause for our operations?

A.  No.


26 May 48-23-2-A-AEH-Gallagher (Weber)

Q.  Subsequently did you receive any further confirmation of the fact that this British intervention had actually been imminent at the time?

A.  After the Western campaign we also found in the French archives a large number of documents which dealt with this Norwegian operation.  In addition, during the course of the Norwegian operation itself, it became evident that apparently a British operation, while our operation had started, was also already in progress.  Otherwise, it would not have been possible that on the afternoon of our arrival in Nolrvik that the British destroyers had already been located outside the Lofoten Fjord; otherwise, no fighting contact could have been established between our battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, and the British battle cruisers which were also in the Lofoten area.

Q.  At the time were you under the impression that it was a justified preventive measure?

A.  Yes, I had that impression at that time, and even today it is my opinion that this operation was militarily necessary and justified.

Q.  May I ask you, in conclusion, to tell us very briefly in what phases of this operation the SKL participated?

A.  There can be no doubt that the whole Norwegian problem was first of all taken up by the SKL and was recognized in the SKL in its whole significance, and, subsequently brought to Hitler's attention for the first time.  That, however, was the nature of the whole matter, because something that was concerned with transporting across the sea would necessarily fall under the responsibility of the SKL.  In addition it is correct that the first discussion between Quisling and a German representative took place, that is, between Quisling and the Chief of Staff of the SKL, and that the latter brought Quisling to Hitler.

Q.  A little briefer, please?

A.  Finally in the last stage, the SKL put into implementation the operational directives which were given by Hitler in the order Wesermunde.

Q.  This brings me to the preparation for the campaign in the West.  In this connection the Indictment said that through the so-called key


26 May 48-23-3-A-AEH-Schaeffer (Gallagher

conferences on 23 May, and 2 August 1939, you were informed of the fact that Hitler intended not to observe the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands.  That is in paragraph 17 and 18 of the Indictment.  Now, is this assertion correct?

A.  I should like to refer to the testimony of the Chief of General Staff of the German Army, General Halder, who has testified before this court about this problem.  About your question on the conference of 23 May, in my opinion there can be no doubt that certain intentions about war in the West, possibly already connected with decisions, intentions, implementation and matters of execution, were not discussed.  In the same way I am certain that this also refers to 22 August, where such intentions and discussions would not have fitted into the tenor of the conference, because during that conference Hitler designated the idea of a warlike conflict in the West as non-existent.  

Q.  According to the entries of the War Diary of the SKL at the beginning of October 1939, you had a discussion with General Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army.  Do you remember the discussion?

A.  Yes.

Q.  What was the substance of this discussion?

A.  At that time during the first days of October I went to see General Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army, in order to find out from him whether he saw any possibilities for giving the Navy a more favorable operational base against England.  As the most advantageous objective, I designated Normandy at that time, or even better, Brest in Britany.  The Chief of Staff of the German Army rejected such ideas, or threads of thought as Utopia, and said that one could not expect anything like such an operation, and that he saw no opportunity for the carrying out of such an operation, and even less, the possibility of achieving such objectives.  

Q.  In this discussion was the question of the occupation of Belgium and Holland mentioned?

A.  I didn't touch upon this question.  General Halder touched upon it


26 May 48-23-4-A-AEH-Gallagher (Schaeffer)

in a very cursory manner, inasmuch as he said, "Even if one could visualize the carrying out of an operation against France perhaps through Belgium and Holland, even then with that kind of objective which you mentioned, Normandy and Brittany would remain a Utopia."  I for my part didn't touch upon this matter at all, because we in the reaching at the Belgium-Dutch Frontier we saw no improvement for a Naval operational base, as the First World War had shown.


26 May 48-A-MB-24-1-Goldberg (Int. Schaeffer)
Court No. V, Case No. XII.

Q  This discussion took place after the war with England and France had broken out?

A  Yes, it took place in the first days of October and England and France had declared war on us on the 3rd of September 1939.

Q  What was your reason for discussing this objective Brest, Brittany and Normandy?

A  The Polish campaign had come to an end.  Now all attention of the Wehrmacht, and thus also of the navy, was directed more strongly towards naval warfare, towards a war against England.  I saw the picture as follows:  Perhaps with the releasing of the forces from Poland there was now a possibility of marching into France by breaking through the Maginot Line.

Q  Were you particularly interested with your suggestion in suggesting an operation against France or what was your basic idea?  What was the aim of your inquiry?

A  In my aims it was very clearly defined what I wanted.  I wanted to reach Normandy-Brittany and I did not think of a route other than via the immediate frontier Germany-France.

Q  What was the interest of the navy in reaching Brest and Normandy?

A  It would have been a more favorable operational base for our naval warfare directed against England.

Q  Were other possibilities discussed, bases for naval warfare and how to achieve such bases?

A  In the discussion with the Chief of Staff of the German army I also touched upon the Norwegian problem and asked him how he visualized an operation of the German army against Norway.  He rejected such an operation completely.  The impetus for this question of mine was undoubtedly given by the letter of Admiral Karls which I had just received during the first days of October.

Q  At that time did you know the memorandum and the directives


26 May 48-A-MB-24-2-Goldberg (Int. Schaeffer)
Court No. V, Case No. XII.

about the conduct of the war in the West?  That is Document L-52, Exhibit 1146, Document Book XV-A, Page 88 of the German and Page 51 of the English text.  (Document handed to witness.)

A  I saw this memorandum for the first time here in Nurnberg.

Q  Do you remember Directive No. 6 for the conduct of war, dated 9 October?  This is Document C-62, Exhibit 1145, Document Book XV-A, Page 48 of the English text and Page 80 of the German text.

A  I could no longer remember this Directive No. 6.  However, I had an opportunity to read it here once again and now I know all about it again.

Q  It is stated there, and I quote, "Amongst others the purpose is to gain as much Belgian, Dutch and Northern French area as possible as a bases for an intended naval war against. England."  Is that consistent with the opinion held by the SKL?

A  No, it is not consistent with the opinion held by the SKL.

Q  Why not?

A  The SKL could not do very much with bases along the Dutch and Belgian coast.

MR. MECKEL:  If Your Honors please, at this point I should like to refer to Document SKL-403 which I am going to submit later and which contains this attitude of the SKL which the Admiral just mentioned and in the document it is entered in the war diary, and it is stated there that the SKL is not interested in bases in Holland and Belgian.

Q  Did the navy participate in preparatory plans and considerations which formed the basis of this directive No. 6?

A  No; otherwise the sentence which you just quoted in this order would not have been included.

Q  What tasks were allotted to the navy according to this directive?

A  As far as I recall I beg your pardon.  It is expressed here in Paragraph 5:  "The SKL has to make every effort in order to support


26 May 48-A-MB-24-3-Goldberg (Int. Schaeffer)
Court No. V, Case No. XII.

the operations of the army and the air force directly or indirectly during the course of this operation."  Such possibilities of supporting the other two branches of the service were not envisaged by the SKL.

Q  In this directive the possibility is also considered that the Western powers might invade Belgium?

A  Yes, that contingency is also expressed in the directive.  In addition there were also indications that such a course might be taken by the Western Powers.

Q  In this connection may I submit Document NOKW-2078 contained in Document Book XV-A, Exhibit 1150, Page 198 of the German and 112 of the English text.  It says there:  "New directive of the Fuehrer.  In the course of Operation West, it has possibly to be expected that the Western powers will disregard Belgian and Dutch neutrality."  Have you found that place?  Do you know on what that attitude is based?

A  Exactly and authentically I can, of course, not give you the reason for the inclusion of this indication in the Fuehrer's Directive; but I have some clues.  We in the SKL had a liaison officer of the German army through whom we generally are informed of the attitudes and measures of the German army and of the General Staff, to the extent to which this lisison [sic] officer was authorized to communicate such opinions to us.  Through this man we learned that the General Staff held the opinion that the manner of the French deployment along the Belgian-French frontier was directed towards a possibility of attack on the part of the British and the French through Belgian territory against our Western frontiers.  There was the additional factor that one-sided troop concentrations of the Belgians along the Belgian-German frontier had been reported.  Information from agents stated similar facts and, finally, - and that was a decisive factor which showed us something about the idea of neutrality on the part of the Belgians and the Dutch, the opinion which prevailed in England and France.  I believe I am not wrong in stating that in the months between September and 


26 May 48-A-MB-25-4-Goldberg (Int. Schaeffer)
Court No. V, Case No. XII.

March approximately 100 protests were lodged on the part of the Germans to Belgium and Holland because of the British and French aircraft – probably more British than French aircraft – flying over Belgian and Dutch territory.

DR. MECKEL:  If Your Honors please, may I suggest, because I have reached the end of a certain chapter now, that we conclude the session for today?

THE PRESIDENT:  We will take a recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 0930 hours, 27 May 1948.)



28 May M-FL-5-3-Sampson (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

THE PRESIDENT:  Any redirect?

DR. MECKE [sic]:  No question in redirect.

THE PRESIDENT:  You may stand aside, then.

DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, I will have any further witnesses for the time being, and thus I have arrived at the end of my presentation in the case of Schniewind except for the presentation of evidence.  Unfortunately I cannot do this now as the document books have not bee [sic] mimeographed in time as I had expected they would be.  I believe they were not served on the Prosecution in good time, and I would ask the Tribunal, therefore, that I may submit them at a later stage.

MR. NIEDERMANN:  We have no objection if he desires to put them in now; we have Document Books I, II and III.

THE PRESIDENT:  You say you have no objection?

MR. NIEDERMANN:  We have no objection.

THE PRESIDENT:  To their being put in at this time you mean?

MR. NIEDERMANN:  That is correct, Books I, II and III.

DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, these documents are originals; they are certified excerpts from books which I hope I will be able to file with the Secretary General at a later stage.  Of course the originals could be submitted at once.

THE PRESIDENT:  In other words, I take it you do not now have the photostats; is that correct?


MR. DOBBS:  If it please the Tribunal, rather than have me interrupt Dr. Meckel during his presentation I would like at this time to make two requests.  One, that in instances where excerpts of a book are being offered, the Prosecution would like to be furnished the complete book; in other words, the excerpts taken as part of the book, we would like to see the full book.  And two, we of course reserve the right to cross examine


28 May-M-FL-5-4-Sampson (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

any witnesses whose affidavits are being submitted.

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, it is understood generally that that privilege of cross examination exists throughout the trial, and, it is understood that as fast as these books are prepared by Counsel and ready, that they will be turned over to the Prosecution, even though they may be admitted zt [sic] a later time.  I mention that for the benefit of any counsel.

JUDGE HALE:  My understanding of Mr. Dobbs' request was where extracts from some book on navy warfare or history are submitted that you request Counsel to submit the entire book for your examination so that if in studying it, you find anything that weakens or contradicts or adds to the extract submitted, that you may also have the privilege of submitting that.  That was your request?

MR. DOBBS:  That is correct.

JUDGE HALE:  You have no objection to that, have you, Doctor?

DR. MECKEL:  I am able to comply with the request except for one case.  I have used excerpts from a Swedish white book, and I have not got a copy of this Swedish white book.  It's the property of a library for international law in the city of Kiel.  I tried to get ahold of it but iunfortunately [sic] I couldn't get it, but, I think that hold good the other way around; you have the documents which are lodged with the British at your disposal.

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, if you do the best you can, we will meet that when we come to it.  Now, before you begin, may I just for the record, a document in Document Book I, as I understand, you presented it the other day as Exhibit No. 1 which was admitted; the photostat that appears on page 1 of your document book.


THE PRESIDENT:  The photostat has not yet been inserted, but is to be inserted; and then on page 2, the one you describe as Document 112, that


28 May-M-FL-5-5-Sampson (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

was admitted this morning as Exhibit No. 2.


THE PRESIDENT:  And now the rest of them are ready to take up?

DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT:  You may proceed.

DR. MECKEL:  The next document I offer is an affidavit of Admiral Buerkner who reports on the political information of the SKL through the Department Ausland Abwehr, that is the foreign intelligence department in the OKW.  This is SKL 102, on page 5 of the document book.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 3.

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, just a moment.  What about this one appearing on page 3; aren't you going to offer that?

DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor, it was just a mistake.

THE PRESIDENT:  In other words, the one on page 3 should be marked Exhibit No. 3.


THE PRESIDENT:  All right.

DR. MECKEL:  As Exhibit 3; I offer SKL-114 to be Exhibit 3.  It's an entry of the war diary of the SKL with appendices.It's [sic] compiled from records and from memory of Admiral Schniewind in order to give a short survey as to the extent of records available.

THE PRESIDENT:  The document will be admitted.


28 May-M-FL-6-1-Sampson (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL-113; it's an excerpt from the book Nauticus, 1939, edition; a comparison of the strength of Britain, France and Germany.  A statistical representation on these figures was put to the Tribunal in the course of my direct examination.  This is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 5.

 THE PRESIDENT:  Well, just a moment.

DR. MECKEL:  It's on page 7.

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, what are you doing with the affidavit on page 5?

DR. MECKEL:  I beg your pardon; I had mentioned it before, but I will repeat what I said.

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, you want the affidavit on page 5 admitted as Exhibit 5?

DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor.  I beg your pardon.

THE PRESIDENT:  It will be admitted.

DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL-113, which I just referred to, will be Schniewind Exhibit No. 5.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-103, is an excerpt from the book a report of the American High Command and contains a report by Admiral King, the former commander in chief of the American Navy and chief of the operational staff of the U.S. Navy.  This excerpt shows the opinion of the Admiral regarding the tasks of the navy and the resultant necessity of armament.  I will submit this document as a reply to exhibit 1023 of the Prosecution and 1444, as a rebuttal to the Prosecution exhibits.

THE PRESIDENT:  Those numbers again, please -- 10 --

DR. MECKEL:  1023 and 1444.

THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you.

DR. MECKEL:  I particularly point out the first paragraph of this excerpt and the following sentence which reads: "in peace time our security


28 May-M-FL-6-2-Sampson (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

measures are determined among other things by the actions of those states which are hostile to the United States and which, rightfully or wrongfully believe that they can take up the fight with us."  And, the last sentence of this paragraph I quote: "The exact strength of the navy which the navy needs to fulfill its task can only be ascertained with great difficulty."

JUDGE HALE:  Dr. do you think it is necessary to make those quotations in presenting this?  We can read and we will have to read these documents.

DR. MECKEL:  Very well.  I would merely ask your permission to point out the salient points, but I will confine myself to a minimum.  This will be Schniewind Exhibit No. 6.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-107, likewise was taken from the report by Admiral King.  I want to show by submitting this that in 1938 other navies also rearmed, including the American Navy, which has been arming since 1933 in view of an inevitable struggle.  With this last term I refer to Exhibit 1444 of the Prosecution in Which [sic] a similar term of a threatened conflict with Great Britain is referred to; and, I offer it as Exhibit Schniewind No. 7.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-101, is an affidavit of the former Admiral Konrad Albrecht.  It describes the danger of enemy attacks on Germany in the 1920's [sic], and the relations with Poland, and, it refers to the study Ost.  I offer this document as Schniewind Exhibit No. 8.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-104, is a report taken from the report by General George Marshall about the time from July to June, 1943.  By submitting this document I wish to establish that even in the view of General Marshall in a tense situation the view of the political situation must


28 May-M-FL-6-3-Sampson (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

not have any influence upon measures of the soldiers.  I will not cite the pertinent passages.


DR. MECKEL:  This is Exhibit No. 9.

THE PRESIDENT:  Exhibit No. 9.

DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-105, is likewise taken from the report; it's an ecerpt [sic] from the report of General Marshall.  I will submit it as a rebuttal to the citations in the indictment in connection with the armament plans.  It is mentioned that a readiness for a war without having any preliminary time for starting it is called for.  A similar remark is contained in this document here that the units ought to be ready on the very shortest notice to be ready for battle.  This I offer as Schniewind Exhibit No. 10.

THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted. 

DR. MECKEL:  SKL-106, is an excerpt from the report by General Arnold, who was the commanding general of the Army Air Forces of the United States.  He reports that thirty-five operation plans had been completed for the event of war.  He is of the opinion that an offensive is the best defense; and, he further calls for long-range bombers for an attack before the enemy is in a position to counter.  I offer this as Schniewind Exhibit No. 11.


MR. DOBBS:  I believe I heard the translation come through a thirty-fi [sic] plans, 35 Operational plans --

DR. MECKEL:  in 1935; correction; that should have been in 1935.  It's offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 11.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-109, which shows the opinion of the world press after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, to which Schniewind yesterday referred in the course of his direct examination.  I offer it as Schniewind Exhibit No. 12.


28 May-M-FL-6-4-Sampson (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII


DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-110, is a continuation of these opinions on the next day, and is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 13.


DR. MECKEL:  Document Book II deals with the Polish campaign and it shows how this development was represented to the outside world, especially to Admiral Schniewind.  The first document deals with the relationship between Poland and Germany from 1920 to 1931; the first document, SKL-201 is an affidavit by the former Reich Chancellor Joseph Wirth about the Polish attempt in 1920 and 1922 to sever forcibly parts of the German territories, and continued unrest special fear against Poland in 1930-1931.  This is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 14.

THE PRESIDENT:  It's admitted.

DR. MECKEL:  The next document I offer was submitted in the Krupp trial.  It's an affidavit by General Adam; it describes an imminent Polish attack in 1931 and German defensive measures in those years.  It's Krupp Document 103, and, it's offered by me as Schniewind Exhibit No. 15.

THE PRESIDENT:  What page is that on?

DR. MECKEL:  Page 4.

THE PRESIDENT:  It's offered as 15?

DR. MECKEL:  Yes, 15, Your Honor.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is Krupp 133, an affidavit by Kurt Grael the former deputy in the Polish parliament.  It describes the steadily mounting tension caused by Polish measures and he reports about his impression of Polish offensive plans, Polish plans of aggression.  It's offered as Schniweind Exhibit No. 16.


DR. MECKEL:  The next documents deal with the German and Polish relati from 1933 until 1939, to May, 1939.  They are taken from the German white


28 May-M-FL-6-5-Sampson (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

book; they are all reports of German consular representatives, of ambassadors, envoys.

SKL-202 is a report from 1936, to be Schniewind Exhibit No. 17.

THE PRESIDENT:  It's admitted.

DR. MECKEL:  SKL-203 is a report from November, 1936, to be Schniewind Exhibit No. 18.

SKL-204 is a report from November, 1937, to be Exhibit No. 19.

THE PRESIDENT:  Wait just a minute.  The one on page 11 is 18?

DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT:  That is admitted.

DR. MECKEL:  The next one is SKL-204.

THE PRESIDENT:  Wait a minute; the next one is 202 that I have.

DR. MECKEL:  SKL-203 is on page 11, your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT:  All right; on page 12 what are you doing with that one?

DR. MECKEL:  That is SKL-204, that is on page 12 and is offered as Exhibit Schniewind 19.

DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT:  The document 204, on page 12, will be admitted as Exhibit 19.

DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, I think it's quitting time.

THE PRESIDENT:  I hadn't noticed, but, I think it is.  We will be in recess for fifteen minutes.

(A recess was taken.)


28 May-M-FL-8-1-Arminger (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

THE MARSHAL:  The Tribunal is again in session.

DR. GRUENEWALD (Attorney for the defendant Lehmann):  Your Honor, I would ask that the defendant Lehmann be excused from attending the sessions on Tuesday and Wednesday morning in order to prepare his case.

THE PRESIDENT:  He may be excused.  The record will so show.

DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL-205, a communication to the Foreigh Office, dated the 5th of November, 1938.  It emanates from the Reichminister of the Interior and speaks about the Polish De-Germanization measures in the Teschen area which led to the flight of the German population to Germany.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 20.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL-206, a telegram of the German Ambassador in Warsaw to the German Foreign Office, dated 24 May 1939, about the mobilization of reservists in Poland, offered as Schniewind Exhibit 21.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-207, on page 15, is a telegram of the German Ambassador at Warsaw to the Foreign Office.  It reports about military circles gaining increasing influence on Polish Foreign Police.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 22.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-208 gives an account of Polish mobilization measures in the northern part of Poland on the 25th of March, 1939.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 23.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-209 is an account of an Anti-German demonstration in Bromberg, on the 26th of March, 1939, with shouts of "We want Dantzig", "We want Koenigsberg", offered as Schniewind Exhibit 24.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-210, a report dated the 13th of April, 1939, about anti-German riots at Pomerellen, is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 25.


28 May-M-FL-8-2-Arminger (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-211 is a report of the German Charge d'Affaires in Warsaw, dated the 20th of May, about a stiffening of attitude against Germany.  Press demands Dantzig must become Polish.  This is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 26.


DR. MECKE:: [sic]  SKL-212, report by the German Consul General in Thorn, dated the 15th of May, 1939, about the transfer of troops to Dantzig and recall of troops from furlough --

THE PRESIDENT:  It is admitted.

DR. MECKEL:  This is Exhibit 28, Schniewind 28.


DR. MECKEL:  Into this period falls the speech of Hitler before the Reichstag on the 23d of May on which SKL-215 records the statement of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch before the International Military Tribunal, which is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 29.


DR. MECKEL:  The following documents show the development from May until August 1939.  SKL-216 is a compilation of quotations from leading Polish papers and statements by leading Polish politians [sic], for instance, such as that "Poland must be united inseparably with East Prussia".  "The Vistula Estuary is the living space of the Polish nation."  "War with Germany is inevitable.  Victory at Berlin will crown it," and other such statements.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 30.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-217 is a report by the German Ambassador, dated 5 July 1939 about the education of the German ethnic group in the ecclesiastical field."  [sic] It is submitted as Exhibit No. 31.



28 May-M-FL-8-3-Arminger (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII

DR. MECKEL:  SKL-218 is a report by the German ambassador in Warsaw about an interview with an official of the Polish Foreign Office about the persecution of the Germans and the minority questions.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 32.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-219, report by the German Consul in Thorn, about the excesses in the period from 5 to 20 July 1939, is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 33.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-220, a report by a Belgium Deputy about his impressions from a visit in Poland, reprinted in the Voelkischer Beobachter in its issued [sic] of 5 August 1939, is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 33.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-221 is an excerpt from a Polish newspaper, in Thorn, dated 8 August 1938 -- I beg your pardon, it is reprinted in the Voelkischer Beobachter, dated 8 August 1939, and a quotation from it is, "We shall expell [sic] the Germans from East Prussia and Silesia, beyond the present frontier."  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 235.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-225 is a record of the Foreign Office, and a compilation of serious cases of persecutions of Germans in Poland, offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 36.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is an affidavit by the former Admiral Erich Foerste.  It was submitted before the IMT as Affidavit 3114 in the trial of the OKW.  The author at that time was commander of one of the two German battleships, that was the battleship Gneisenau which in July 1939 sailed in Atlantic waters without being equipped with the necessary munitions for fighting in case of war.  It is offered as Exhibit 37.


28 May-M-FL-8-4-Arminger (Int. Weber)
Court No. V, Case XII


DR. MECKEL:  The next affidavit is a statement by a former Vice-Admiral.  He reports about the way in which Admiral Raeder in the summer of 1939 informed higher naval officers about the situation and he assued [sic] these officers that no warlike conflicts were to be expected in the next few years.  This affidavit is also taken from the evidence submitted to the IMT.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 38.


DR. MECKEL:  In this period, we also have the address of Hitler in Obersalzberg on the 22d [sic] of August and I submit SKL-226, the statement of Grand Admiral Raeder before the IMT about the contents of this address.  This is submitted as Schniewind Exhibit No. 39.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-227 is the testimony of Field Marshall von Bruchtisch also about this address of Hitler in which he states that Hitler had emphasized the negotiations with Poland would be continued.  This is submitted as Exhibit Schniewind 40.



28 May 48_M_SW_9_1_Gallagher (Weber)
Court 5, Case 12

DR. MECKEL:  SKL 234 is also taken from the evidence submitted to the IMT.  That is from the evidence of the defense of Grand Admiral Raeder.  This is an affidzvit [sic] by the former Grand Admiral Boehm, and contains as an appendix a record which this Admiral made directly after conferences in accordance with notes which he made during the conferences.  This record was taken a few minutes after the conferences, and in my view it representsthe [sic] only record of probative value regarding this conference.  It is well known who made it.  It has been stated when it was recorded.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 41.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL 229 gives an account of the shooting of German aircraft outside of Polish territory on 23 and 24 August, and is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 42.


Q.  The next document is SKL 230.  I'll have to make an interruption.  I don't know whether SKL 230 is contained in the English Document Book.  I don't want to submit SKL 230.  The next document I wish to submit is SKL 231.

THE PRESIDENT:  In other words, 230 appears in this book.

DR. BECKEL [sic]:  That is right.

THE PRESIDENT:  You are not submitting that.

DR. MECKEL:  No, Your Honor.  The next document is SKL 231, on page 90.  It is a statement by the Swedish witness, Dahlerus, before the IMT.  It is an account of the attitude of the Polish Ambassador on 31 August 1939, and records the statement, "That he was not interested in discussing thenote [sic] with the German Government and who stated that in case of war the Polish Army would march in triumph in Berlin."  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 43.

DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 233.  It is an excerpt from a speech by President [sic] on "Freedom of the Seas" and is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 44.



28 May 48_M_SW_9_2_Gallagher (Weber)
Court 5, Case 12

MR. DOBBS:  With respect to this last document, I specifically request that there be offered the whole test of his speech.

THE PRESIDENT:  Very well, you have that, do you, Dr. Meckel?

DR. MECKEL:  Your Honor, this excerpt which is contained in here is taken from the book which was submitted as evidence before the IMT.  This book contains likewise only excerpts from speeches of President Roosevelt, which were selected not by a German agency, but by some American agency, and disseminated in Germany after the war, and it is available.

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, if you have the source from which you took it, that is the thing to submit to the Prosecution.

DR. MECKEL:  That is the source, yes, YourHonor [sic].  I now turn to Document Book III, which contains the antecedents of the occupation of Norway according to German documents.  That is, according to the records which at the time were available and formed the records for a picture which Admiral Achniewind [sic] had at the time. 

The first document is SKL 304.  The testimony of Grand Admiral Erich Raeder before the IMT relating to the events which led up to the Norway campaign.  I offer that as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 45.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is an affidavit of a former Captain Assmann of the German Navy.  This officer in the first months of the war compiled the war diary of the SKL, and he was present at all conferences held in the SKL.  I submit document SKL 302 as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 46.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 303.  It is an affidavit of the former Rear Admiral von Puttkamer, who at the time was the Naval Adjutant to Hitler.  He reports about an oral report by Raeder at Hitlers on 10 Octoberand [sic] the fact that during this time this is the first time the Norwegian operation was mentioned, and the anxiety the British might land in Norway, which was the reasons for taking up this idea.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 47.


28 May 48_M_SW_9_3_Gallagher (Weber)
Court v, Case 12


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 306, an excerpt from the War Diary of the SKL, containing entry of 4 October, which states that the English consulates in Norway were reinforced and partly filled with English Navy officers.  That is one of the few records contained in the War Diary with extracts about news from Norway at the time.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 48.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 308.  It is likewise an excerpt from the War Diary of the SKL, and gives an account of the visits of the former Norwegian Minister of War Quisling which he paid to the commander of the Navy, and is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 49.  I may add that in this entry it is pointed out here, that in another part of the War Diary, that is, in Part C, Book II and Book VII, that further records were contained in these parts.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 340, an affidavit by former Lieutenant Commander, Richard Schrieber, who at the time was German Naval Attaché in Oslo.  This officer was mentioned by Admiral Schniewind during his examination, and he himself now reports about the intelligence which he received.  SKL 340 is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 50.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 309, which is an excerpt from a collection of documents on the Law of Naval Warfare.  It is a collection of documents which at the time were compiled and edited by the OKM and is now contained in the archives of the International Military Tribunal.  The excerpt as produced here deals with the intervention of the British Navy and Air Forces in the Norwegian territorial waters in November and December 1939, and in January 1940.  I offer this excerpt as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 51.



28 May 48_M_SW_9_4_Gallagher (Weber)
Court 5, Case 12

DR. MECKEL:  Document SKL 310 is an excerpt from the War Diary of SKL.  It is pointed out that "Studie North" has been received and news about the intensification of British Warfare, I offer that as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 52.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL 307 is likewise an excerpt from the War Diary of the SKL, and you will find there misgivings by the SKL with respect to the Norway Operation, and their position with respect to the maintenance of the present state or status quo was the most favorable solution.  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 53.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL 341 is likewise an excerpt from the War Diary with information about British political and propaganda pressure on Norway.  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 54.

THE PRESIDENT:  Admitted.  Do you have a further comment?

DR. MECKEL:  No, Your Honor.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is an affidavit by Admiral Theodor Krancke, who was at the time a member of the special staff Norway to the OKW.  Admiral Krancke reports about the meeting of this staff, about their assignments, about the conditions under which he worked and what was to take place at the time and how the tasks were dealt with specifically.  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 55.



28 May - M-LU-10-1-Gallagher (Int. Weber)
Court V - Case XII

DR. MECKEL:  Document SKL 312, an excerpt from the Diary of General Halder submitted as Prosecution's Exhibit No. 1340.  The excerpt here produced was not translated in the English version, which was prepared by the Prosecution, and that is why it is submitted here.  The entry shows that the air forces prompted the occupation of Denmark.  That was at the end of February 1940.  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 56.


DR. MECKEL:  Document SKL 315 is likewise an excerpt from the previously mentioned collection of documents on Naval Law, which is also in the archives of IMT.  Those documents related to "Altmark Case".  This "Altmark Case" according to testimony of Admiral Schniewind was an essential point in appraising the position.  I submit the delcaration [sic] by the Norwegian Foreign Minister in this case, and the statement by the British Prime Minister and the Norwegian Foreign Minister with respect to the appraisal on the International Law in this case.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 57.

THE PRESIDENT:  It is admitted.

DR. MECKE [sic]:  The next document is C-100.  It is an excerpt from the Minutes of the oral report of the Commander-in-chief of the Navy to Hitler on 23 February 1940, in which he discussed the different possibilities of solving the Norwegian question and the position of the Navy which was well known was represented to the effect that it was most favorable for Norway to remain neutral.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 58.


DR. MECKE [sic]:  SKL 316 is also an excerpt from the War Diary of SKL, dated 4 March, which mentioned the preparation for defense on the part of Norway, and the facilities for defending Norway against possible British intervention.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 59.


28 May - M-LU-10-2-Gallagher (Int. Weber)
Court V - Case XII


DR. MECKE [sic]:  SKL 321 also is an excerpt from the War Diary of SKL which points to an imminent action against Norway, and is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 60.


DR. MECKE [sic]:  SKL 317 is a compilation which was made at the time at the SKL about the violation of neutrality by British Naval Forces in Norwegian Territorial waters, and in this tabulation they are to make clear that the violations of neutrality, or disregard on the part of the British of the neutrality was continued, and in fact, even intensified.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 61.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 318.  That is likewise taken from a collection of documents on the law of Naval Warfare, and describes some very drastic cases of British intervention in the Norwegian Territorial Waters.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 62.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL 322 is an entry from the War Diary of SKL, dated 27 March 1940 -- SKL 382, a report from Norway of imminent British action.  This note points to the current file "Weseruebung" War Diary, which is contained in the same excerpt.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 63.

THE PRESIDENT:  Just a moment.  Is that SKL 382 or 322.

DR. MECKEL:  It is 322, Your Honor.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 323, an excerpt from the War Diary of SKL, dated 8 April, giving an account of the laying of mines in Norwegian Territorial Waters, which were referred to yesterday on direct examination.  It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 64.


28 May - M-LU-10-3-Gallagher (Int. Weber)
Court V - Case XII


DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 324, and it is an entry in the War Diary of SKL, and gives an account of the capture of British Operational Orders.  In this case that was under the Stratford Plan, with respect to landing operations in Norway.  I would like to remind you that the term "Stratford Plan" and its objective was known to the SKL as early as March, because they had broken the code of the British Radio communication, as was testified to yesterday by the witness.  The captured order was attached to the appendices of the War Diary.  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 65.


DR. MECKEL:  The next series of documents deal with the antecedent of the occupation of Norway according to British, French and Swedish documents.  At the time of the preparation of the Norwegian operations, these documents were not as yet in German hands.  They did, however, in the course of the war fall into German hands, and by submitting them I wish to establish, or to make clear that even during the course of the war incoming information confirmed the justification of this operation, and, of course, gives the attitude of the SKL, including that of Admiral Schniewind, regarding subsequently received information, and other designs which might not have been overlooked at the time.

The first document is an excerpt from the White Book, which has now been published in Sweden.  It also is based on the submitted documents, and it shows an account on the neutral country and of the events as they are seen now.  I want to submit it in connection with the report which Grand Admiral Raeder made in his testimony before the IMT, a certified German translation of the Swedish White Book, the original of which is contained in the Institute of International Law in the City of Kiel.

It is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 66.


28 May - M-LU-10-4-Gallagher (Int. Weber)
Court V - Case XII

THE PRESIDENT:  What page is that, please.

DR. MECKEL:  Page 72 and page 76.

THE PRESIDENT:  It is admitted.

DR. MECKEL:  The next document is SKL 325, taken from the German White Book, which is contained in the Evidence Library in the Palace of Justice, and deals with the reconnaissance orders of the British Admiralty of December 1939, which are along the same lines for an appraisal of the necessity of gaining air bases, which are reflected in the diaries of the SKL, and which has been submitted by the Prosecution.  This record is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit No. 67.



28 May 48-M-DC-11-1-Goldberg (Weber)
Court 5, Case 12

DR. MECKEL:  SKL-326 is an espionage order of the British Admiralty, dated 31 January 1939, directed to the British Consul in Narvik.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 68.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-327, a letter of the British Naval Attache in Stockholm who, just as the German attache', was included in those espionage orders of his country.  It is directed to the British Consul in Narvik, dated February 1940, about further additional espionage orders.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 69.

THE PRESIDENT:  What is the document you are talking about?

DR. MECKEL:  SKL-327 on page 83.  Perhaps I have been too fast.  I mentioned a further espionage order directed to the British Consul in Narvik, dated January, on page 82.  It was offered by me as Exhibit 68.

THE PRESIDENT:  Just a moment.  Going back to 325 on page 77, am I right that that is 67?


THE PRESIDENT:  And then the next one is on page 79?


DR. MECKEL:  According to the German it is on page 82.

THE PRESIDENT:  I beg your pardon.  I got it in the wrong place.  Now, 69 is on page --

DR. MECKEL:  83.

THE PRESIDENT:  I have it now.  69 is admitted.

DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-328, on page 85, is taken from the secret files of the French General Staff.  It is a telegram of the French Prime Minister Daladier to the French Ambassador in London, dated January 1940.  Daladier in this telegram urges the expansion of the military and maritime activities in Scandinavia.  In this telegram Daladier expresses his opinion that every pretext which might permit the gaining of influence on the war situation ought to be fully


28 May 48-M-DC-11-2-Goldberg (Weber)
Court 5, Case 12

exploited.  This document is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 70.


DR. MECKEL:  The next document, SKL-328, on page 87, also emanates from the secret files of the French General Staff.  It is a communication from the French Prime Minister, Daladier, to the French Ambassador in London, dated February 1940.  It concerns the intervention in Norway, the main objective of which, as is stated in the document, is to cut off Germany from her ore supplies.

Your Honor, I see that there is an error here.  This document bears the same document number as the preceding document.  Your Honor, may I suggest that it be received with the same exhibit number as the preceding document 328; that this document be appended to Exhibit 70?

THE PRESIDENT:  Very well.

JUDGE HALE:  Why not just call it 328a?

DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor, certainly.

THE PRESIDENT:  That will be better, I think, 328a.

DR. MECKEL:  And it will then become Schneiwind Exhibit 71.

THE PRESIDENT:  Yes, and as such it will be admitted.

DR. MECKEL:  SKL-335, likewise taken from the secret files of the French General Staff, are notes of the French Commander-in-Chief, General Gamelin.  They report that since the 16th of January the landings of allied troops had been planned.  The main target was the ore mines in Northern Sweden.  At the same time Gamelin suggests an operation in the Balkans in order to intensify the economic throttling of Germany.  I offer this document as Schneiwind Exhibit 72.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-329 is likewise taken from the secret files of the French General staff.  It is a report on the negotiations of the Scandinavian Commission of 11 March.  I point to the first sentence of the second paragraph, that the issue was not to effect a forcible


28 May 48-M-DC-11-3-Goldberg (Weber)
Court 5, Case 12

landing but to demonstrate power.  This to me seems to be an instance that the military pressure was note merely haunting the minds of Germans.  I offer this document as Schneiwind Exhibit 73.


DR. MECKEL:  The next Document is SKL-337.  It is an excerpt from the Swedish White Book which I mentioned previously.  It indicates the diplomatic preparations of the British and the handing over of an aide-memoire to the government of Sweden.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 74.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-336, an excerpt, is likewise taken from the Swedish White Book.  It shows the resolutions of the sixth meeting of the Supreme Council l, dated 26 March 1940.  The same document is also contained in the German White Book.  It was t aken [sic] from the captured files of the French General Staff.  This is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 75.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-331, likewise from the secret files of the French General Staff, is a telegram of the French Military attache in London to General Gamelin, which indicates the time limits for this landing had already been fixed, which was to take place approximately at the same time as the German landing actually took place.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit 76.


DR. MECKEL:  SKL-330, on page 108, is an excerpt from British operational orders for the preparation of the occupation of the North Swedish ore mines from Narvik.  It shows that the preparations on that side were not only confirmed to Narvik but that they also extended to Swedish territory.  It is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 77.



28 May 48-M-DC-11-4-Goldberg (Weber)
Court 5, Case 12

DR. MECKEL:  SKL-332, likewise from the secret files of the French General Staff, is a communication of the Supreme Commander of the French Navy, Admiral Darlan, to Daladier, which was drafted immediately after the German occupation of Norway.  It indicates that Admiral Darlan was of the opinion that the German High Command was bound to know the enemy's decisions because Darlan didn't think much of the discretion observed at the conference.  This is offered as Schniewind's Exhibit 78.


DR. MECKEL:  The last document, SKL-333, is the minutes of the meeting of the French War Committee of 26 April 1940.  This document reveals that German Naval forces were being shipped and so camouflaged on merchant shipping that they were not detected by the British Intelligence Service.  Moreover, the question of possible operations on the Balkans is to be examined.  This is offered as Schniewind Exhibit No. 79.


DR. MECKEL:  I then have finished presenting my documents in Books I to III.  The next documents can be presented when the document books have been served on the Prosecution and I would like to be able to do this at a later stage.

THE PRESIDENT:  You may have that privilege.  You have done a very good job of putting in 79 documents; with a pretty long statement as to each one you have done that in a very short time.  Now, that is all that you have with respect to your case that you are able to present today?  You are through except for the documents?

DR. MECKEL:  Yes, your Honor.  I will conclude my case today for the time being.

THE PRESIDENT:  General von Roques' case is next.  Is there a representative of General von Roques present?  You may just be seated.  If counsel for General von Roques will come into chambers and some representative of the Prosecution for just a few minutes we will talk